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ABSTRACT
Digital image forensics is a field encompassing camera identification, forgery detection and ste-
ganalysis. Statistical modeling and machine learning have been successfully applied in the academic
community of this maturing field. Still, large gaps exist between academic results and applications
used by practicing forensic analysts, especially when the target samples are drawn from a different
population than the data in a reference database.
This thesis contains four published papers aiming at narrowing this gap in three different fields:
mobile stego app detection, digital image steganalysis and camera identification. It is the first work
to explore a way of extending the academic methods to real world images created by apps. New
ideas and methods are developed for target images with very rich flexibility in the embedding rates,
embedding algorithms, exposure settings and camera sources. The experimental results proved that
the proposed methods work very well, even for the devices which are not included in the reference
database.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of Problems
As mobile Internet and telecommunication technology is developing at high speed, the digital
image forensics academic community is facing a growing challenge. Mobile applications (apps)
allow a user to easily edit/process an image for a variety of purposes. Unfortunately, terrorists,
spies and child pornography predators are also taking the advantage of the mobile app ecosystem to
exchange illegal files and photos. The process of hiding a payload ( message ) in an innocent image
is called image “steganography”, and the forensic analysis of a photography for hidden content
is “steganalysis”. Table 1.1 displays some of steganography apps available from the Google Play
Store, and some have been downloaded and installed more than 10,000 times. Now the question
is, for a given image, can we identify if the suspect image has information embedded using one of
those stego apps?
There are several commercial software/programs claiming to detect stego images (images with
payload). But as we can see from Table 1.2 and 1.3 in Newman et al. (2019), since those commercial
programs are only designed for detecting the standard steganography embedding algorithms ( F5
in this case Westfeld (2001) ), they are not capable of detecting the stego images generated by
Table 1.1 Selected steganography apps from the Google Play Store
App Name # Installs Output Format Open Source
PixelKnot 100,000 - 500,000 JPEG yes
Steganography Master 10,000 - 50,000 PNG no
Steganography M 10,000 - 50,000 PNG no
Da Vinci Secret Image 5,000 - 10,000 PNG no
PocketStego 1,000 - 5,000 PNG no
MobiStego 1,000 - 5,000 PNG yes
Passlok Privacy 1,000 - 5,000 JPEG yes
2
the app PixelKnot, which implements the F5 algorithm but erases the algorithm signature, that is
usually used by commercial software for stego detection of F5.
Table 1.2 Error of detection on images generated by standard F5
Error Type Stego Hunt DC3−StegDetect Provos−StegDetect
False Alarm 0% 0% 24.6%
Misdetection 5.2% 0% 47.4%
Avg. Error 2.6% 0% 36.0%
Table 1.3 Error of detection on images generated by PixelKnot
Error Type Stego Hunt DC3−StegDetect Provos−StegDetect
False Alarm 0% 0% 24.6%
Misdetection 100% 100% 75.4%
Avg. Error 50% 50% 50%
It is well-known that machine learning (ML) is a very powerful tool in detecting stego images
created by academic steganography methods. But academic steganography and steganalysis tech-
niques are built for the academic environment with data typically collected from only a few digital
still cameras. Applying an academic machine-learning-based detection method to real-world data
is not feasible. First, real-world data has large variance in exposure settings and embedding rates,
which is not the typical case in the academic world. Second, as Fig. 1.1 displays, an input image
provided by the user is processed before the embedding step by the app, and therefore an input
image is not necessarily the cover image in the traditional definition. Moreover, the number of
camera sources of the real-world images is practically countless, so there is no way to include every
source device in the database for every test image. This is called cover-source-mismatch problem
in the academic community of digital image steganalysis. According to Kodovskỳ et al. (2014),
when the source device is not included in the training data set, the detection accuracy may drop
significantly. Aiming at stego apps, we need to move academic discoveries closer to real world
implementations. It is necessary to build an image database that represents “in the wild” scenarios,
which involves many apps (many embedding methods), many embedding rates, and many different
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Figure 1.1 The challenge of using ML to identify the stego images created by stego apps .
source devices. But then a new question arises: with limited resources, how can we make the image
data more representative?
1.2 Dissertation Contributions and Outline
This dissertation contains four published papers and some supplementary material to explore the
way of hunting images produced with stego apps by using a benchmarking image database. Chapter
2 provides the necessary background knowledge on digital image forensics, which includes basic
knowledge about digital image processing, steganography algorithms, ML-based steganalysis, and
Photo-Response-Non-Uniformity-based camera identification methods. Chapter 3 is a published
paper with two main authors. The reverse-engineering of stego apps, the batch generation of image
data and the algorithms of detecting stego apps by their signatures are attributed to Mr. Chen,
Wenhao. The definition of the “ cover images” for a stego app, the idea of using the ”signature” to
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detect a stego app, and the study of machine-learning-based stego detection are my contributions.
This is the first time machine learning has been used to classify the stego images with flexible
embedding rates generated by mobile apps. Chapter 4 is a conference paper presented at IEEE
International Conference on Image Processing 2018. For the first time, the impact of exposure
settings in digital image forensics has been discussed by a series of experiments designed by myself.
Chapter 5 is my first publication discussing the domain adaptation problems in steganalysis, in
which I found a solution to apply ML-based steganalysis algorithms to image data without their
camera source included in the training data. Chapter 6 is another conference paper published
and presented at Electronic Imagining 2019 , in which I propose a bold idea of using data from
the simplest steganography algorithm to detect stego images generated by three complex adaptive
embedding algorithms, and the experiments run by Ms. Reinders verified my conjecture. The
conclusions and future plans are discussed in Chapter 7. Since the page limit of a publication is
rigid, many motivated results had to be abandoned when the paper was submitted. Therefore, in
this thesis, I also selected some unpublished results, including Sections 3.8, 4.6, 5.9 and 5.10, as
the appendices to the associated chapters to expand on the story.
1.3 References
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CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overall review of the concepts and algorithms in digital
image forensics. To begin with, we introduce the notations and terminologies of digital images in
Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, from the simplest LSB embedding in the spatial domain to the nsF5 in
the frequency domain, we summarize most steganography embedding algorithms used in the thesis.
The machine-learning-based steganalysis method is discussed in Section 2.3, and the PRNU-based
camera identification method is provided in Section 2.4.
2.1 Introduction of digital images formats
Digital image forensics is a young and emerging field of analysing digital evidence on the origin
and veracity of digital images. Camera identification, image forgery, and digital image steganalysis
are three well-known sub-fields of digital image forensics. With the rise of the mobile Internet, many
researchers switched their interests to the analysis of photo editing apps. For all above problems,
digital images are the main forensic objects to examine.
There are many types of digital representations of images. In this thesis, two most common
image formats are mainly discussed. The first type is called the Raster formats, which can be
viewed as a sample of colors on a sufficiently dense rectangular grid. It is also one of the digital
image formats defined on the Spatial Domain. Image formats such as BMP, TIFF and PNG are
all belongs to the raster format type, and they all store the images’ spatial pixels in a row-by-row
manner with one or more bytes per pixel, depending on the specific format standard.
In image processing, instead of viewing the natural images as matrices, an image is defined as
a two-dimensional function f(x, y), where x and y are spatial coordinates, and the amplitude of
f at any pair of coordinates is called the intensity (or gray level) of the image at that point. In
general, f(x, y), x, and y are all continuous. After the quantization of the the amplitude f on a
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discrete sample of (x, y) plane, f(x, y), x, and y are all discrete, and the image f(x, y) now becomes
a digital image. For a digital image of raster format, each color channel can be represented by using
a M ×N matrix (2-dimensional numerical array) of integers from the range {0, ..., 2d − 1}. For a
true-color BMP image in the Red-Green-Blue(RGB) model, it needs three matrices to represent,
and d=8 in this case. Fig. 2.1 gives an example to illustrate the pixel grid for a RGB image defined
on the spatial coordinates.
0 1 2 3 4 5
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2
3
4
5
x-axis
y-axis
 (x, y)= (4, 2)
f(4, 2)=(255,255,255)
 (x, y)= (1, 1)
f(1, 1)=(0,0,128)
 (x, y)= (0, 5)
f(0, 5)=(192,192,192)
 (x, y)= (5, 5)
f(5, 5)=(255,255,0)
Figure 2.1 Coordinate conventions of digital images in the spatial domains
Another type of formats for digital images are the transform-domain (or frequency-domain)
formats, and JPEG format is one of them. The word JPEG stands for the Joint Photographic
Experts Group. Since other frequency-domain formats, such as JPEG2000, are not discussed in
this thesis, we only introduce the JPEG format in this section.
To begin with, for RGB color cubes with their range in {0, ..., 255}3, the Y CrCb color model is
defined as a linear transform from the RGB model, by the following transform:
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in which Cr and Cb are the red-difference and blue-difference chrominance components. In this
way, the Y CrCb model represents color as brightness and two color-difference signals. Notice that,
after the transform, the luminance Y and chrominance Cr, Cb share the same intensity range as
a color channel of the RGB model. The benefits of separating the luminance Y and chrominance
matrices are discussed next.
The next step is to divide the luminance signal Y into 8 × 8 blocks. The JPEG compression
format compares every 8 by 8 block of pixels in the image to a linear combination of 64 standard
patterns. Since human eyes are much less sensitive to changes in chroma than in luminance, the
chrominance signals are often represented with fewer bits without introducing visible distortion into
the image. So in practice, the chrominance signals Cb and Cr may be sub-sampled before dividing
into 8× 8 blocks.
Now we apply the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) to each 8× 8 block of the Y CrCb signal.
The DCT can be consider as a change of basis locally to represent the image. For an 8× 8 block of
luminance (or chrominance) matrix Y[i, j], i, j =0,...7, the 8× 8 block of DCT coefficients d[m,n],
m, n=0,...,7 is computed as a linear combination of luminance values in the same block by:
d[m,n] =
7∑
i,j=0
w[m]w[n]
4
cos
π
16
m(2i+ 1)cos
π
16
n(2j + 1)Y[i, j], (2.1)
where w[0]= 1√
2
and w[k]= 1, for all k ≥ 0. The first coefficient term d[0,0] is called the DC
coefficient (zero frequency in both dimensions), and other coefficients are AC coefficients.
Quantization of the transform coefficients produces new coefficients that provide data loss, and
thus compression. By dividing each coefficient by a fixed integer and rounding, we produce new
coefficient values, many of which are smaller than the original ones and many that are zero. The
quantization formula is given as:
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D[m,n] = round(
d[m,n]
Q[m,n]
), m, n ∈ {0, ..., 7}, (2.2)
where the Q[m,n] is called the quantization matrix (or quantization table). Every independent
JPEG standard recommends a set of quantization matrices indexed by a quality factor q. As the
last step, the quantized DCT coefficients are losslessly compressed by using Huffman coding and
then saved with a header to files with the extension ’.jpg’ or ’.jpeg’.
2.2 Digital Image Steganography
Messages or data can be hidden in digital images in such a way that the human eye cannot detect
any visual difference in the pictures. This act of “hiding in plain sight” is called steganography.
The word steganography is a composite of the Greek words steganos, which means “ covered,” and
graphia, which means “ writing.” The first use of the term “ steganography” can be traced back
to 1518, when Johannes Trithemius published his cryptographic book Polygraphia. Since then,
field of steganography shares much in common with the larger field of cryptography. The goal of
cryptography is to allow two parties to exchange a message without a third party being able to
decipher the messages. The most typical example is that Alice and Bob are both in prison. They
have access to email, and Alice wants to send Bob a message that Eve, the warden, can’t read. Eve
has access to both Alice’s and Bob’s emails, so Alice has to encrypt the message with a password (or
key) and send the encrypted message to Bob, and then Bob can use his key to decrypt the message.
Although Eve cannot understand the ecrypted message immediately, the mysterious message may
still catch her attention, and then call for help from experts to decrypt the message. The idea
behind digital image steganography is that Alice and Bob want to share secret information without
Eve even knowing that secret information is being exchanged. Alice might choose an innocuous
digital image, perhaps a picture of cat, and then embed the message, “We escape at dawn,” to
the digital format of the cat image, without changing the visual properties, by using a particular
steganography algorithm. In this case, even if Eve has the access to the image attachment, the
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image will not arouse her suspicion. The digital image that Alice picks to embed is called a cover
image. The message, “We escape at dawn,” is called a payload. The image with the embedded
payload is called a steganographic image, or stego image for short.
2.2.1 LSB embedding
Least-Significant-Bit (LSB) embedding is the simplest and most common steganographic algo-
rithm. It can be applied to any collection of numerical data represented in digital form. It is also
widely implemented and modified by developers to write stego apps. Besides, the art of hiding
data in the LSB plane has been borrowed to other advanced embedding algorithms, such as WOW,
S-UNIWARD, and matrix embedding methods.
From now on, let X[i] ∈X n = {0, . . . , 2d−1} be a sequence of integers, where d refers to the bit
depth or color depth. If the cover image is an 8-bit gray-scale image, then X[i] represents the level
of light intensity at the ith pixel (d = 8), and in the frequency domain, X[i] could be the quantized
DCT coefficient of a JPEG image. In either case, each X[i] can be represented using d many bits
b[i, 1], . . . ,b[i, d], and with this notation, a digital image can also be represent by:
X[i] =
d−1∑
k=0
b[i,k]2k.
This is a binary representation of digital image X, We call b[i, 0] the Least-Significant-Bit (LSB)
and b[i, d] the Most-Significant-Bit. Fig. 2.2 provides an example of the bit plane representation
for an 8-bit image.
Since any change happens in the LSB is not significant, LSB embedding algorithms can just
replace the LSBs of X[i] with the message bits m[i], without any visual observation. In the real
world cases, m[i] can be obtained by using some encryption methods on any text messages/files.
The pseudo-code for embedding a bit stream into an image through a pseudo-random path generate
by a given key is present in Algorithm 1, which is summarized in Fridrich (2009).
We note here that, for the LSB embedding algorithm, the maximum change in the gray values
is always 1 : maxi|X[i] −Y[i]| = 1. For any given 8-bit greyscale or true-color images, this small
amount of changes cannot be distinguished by human eyes. Actually, for any given natural images
10
Figure 2.2 Bit plane representation for an 8-bit image.
Algorithm 1 Embedding message m ∈ {0, 1}m in cover image X
Input: cover image X ∈X n , stego key, message m ∈ {0, 1}m
1: Initialize a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator by using stego key (or password)
2: Path=Permutation(n);
3: // Permutation(n) is a pseudo-random permutation of {1,2,...,n}.
4: Y = X;
5: m=min(m,n);
6: for each i = 1 to m do
7: Y[Path[i]]=X[Path[i]]+m[i]-X[Path[i]]mod2
8: end for
9: return Y
without any embedding, since they also contain some noise, the LSB plane seems to take a random
values on {0, 1}. According to Algorithm. 1, the only difference of LSB planes between a cover
image and a stego image is located at the embedding path, where the different values are exactly
same as the bit stream m[i]. Therefore, if the encryption algorithms are well developed such that
the bit representation m pick values from {0, 1} randomly as well, then even if the embedded image
data is examined by looking at the LSB plane, non-experts will not find anything suspicious.
In the standard LSB embedding algorithm, a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator determines
the path to hide the payload bit stream, which makes the LSB embedding less secure in two ways.
On one hand, based on Dodis et al. (2013), Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator itself is not always
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secure, especially if a user always uses the same key. As we can see in the next section, if Eve
has the knowledge of stego path, she can easily apply a Chi-squared test on any given image to
find out if it is a stego image or not. On the other hand, in standard LSB embedding algorithm,
the path is totally independent of the LSB values, which makes outputs much more vulnerable to
the machine-learning-based steganalysis. If an embedding algorithm determines the hiding path by
their grey-scale values, we call it an content-adaptive steganography algorithm.
2.2.2 Advanced Spatial-domain Steganography
Three popular content-adaptive steganography algorithms are used in this thesis, and all claim
to somehow minimize the distortion between cover images and stego images. The concept of
distortion function and and its property can be found at the book Fridrich (2009). HUGO, which
introduced by Pevnỳ et al. (2010), is the first spatial domain embedding algorithm minimizing an
additive distortion function. After HUGO, a complete framework of finding the best steganography
algorithm for given covers by solving a constrained optimization problem for the average distortion,
is set up by the paper Filler and Fridrich (2010). In this section, we only introduce the general idea
of the distortion function and its applications.
A very natural measure of such distortion between a cover image X ∈ X n = {0, ..., 255}n and
the corresponding stego image Y ∈X n can be defined by using the p-norm of their difference:
Dist(X,Y ) = ‖X − Y ‖pp =
n∑
i=1
|X[i]− Y [i]|p p ≥ 1 (2.3)
Or defined by the counting measure:
Dist(X,Y ) =
n∑
i=1
1− δ(X[i]− Y [i]) (2.4)
in which the Kronecker delta δ is defined as:
δ(x) =

1 when x = 0
0 when x 6= 0
(2.5)
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In general, to find the optimal embedding for any given cover X ∈ X n = {0, ..., 255}n in the
sense of minimizing some distortion, we first define Y ⊂X n as the set of all possible stego images
generated from X by all possible algorithms, and p(Y ) = p(Y,X,Alg) = Pr{Alg(X) = Y} the
probability of algorithm Alg mapping the cover image X to a stego image Y ∈ Y . p(Y ) is also well-
known as the ”cost of changing X to Y ”.Therefore, the stego image is now a random variable Y over
Y with a probability mass function p(y), and every embedding algorithm is actually determined
by the pair of {Y , p(Y )}.
Now consider any possible bounded distortion function:
D : Y −→ R (2.6)
|D(Y )| < K, for all Y ∈ Y some large number K (2.7)
Then the expected distortion can be represented as:
E(D) =
∑
Y
p(Y )D(Y ) (2.8)
To evaluate the security, Filler and Fridrich (2010) suggests using the entropy:
H({p,Y }) = −
∑
Y ∈Y
p(Y )log(p(Y )) (2.9)
to measure the maximal expected payload size, and in this way, the problem of finding the
most secure embedding algorithm with payload size m, is transformed to the following constrained
optimization problem:
min
p
E(D) =
∑
Y ∈Y
p(Y )D(Y ) (2.10)
subject to H({p,Y }) = −
∑
Y ∈Y
p(Y )log(p(Y )) = m (2.11)
The optimal solution p(Y ) should have the Gibbs form, which means:
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pλ(Y ) =
exp(−λD(Y ))∑
Y ∈Y exp(−λD(Y ))
(2.12)
for some parameter λ to determined. In practise, the distortion function D(Y ) can be assumed
to have a form as ”Di,j(Y ) := D(Yi,j)”, and then the cost function pi,j(Y ) := p(Yi,j) can be
viewed as the cost of change at each individual pixel, which makes the optimization problem 2.10-
2.11 much easier to solve with a pixel-wise representation of 2.12 . However, it is still an open
problem to design a distortion function relating to some statistical similarity measure, e.g. by
using the Kullback–Leibler divergence. In this section, we only provide the general ideas of the
three content-adaptive spatial domain embedding algorithms, which include WOW by Holub and
Fridrich (2012) , S-UNIWARD by Holub et al. (2014) and MiPOD by Ker et al. (2013). For more
details of those three algorithms, we refer to the original publications.
WOW is short for Wavelet Obtained Weights for the additive distortion function. The design
of WOW tends to mainly embed the payload in the textured regions by using directional high-pass
filters (horizontally, vertically and diagonally). In WOW, the distortion function D of stego Y for
given cover X is assume to have a form:
DX(Y ) =
n∑
i=1
ωi(X,Y [i]) |X[i]− Y [i]| =
n∑
i=1
ωi(X,Y [i]) (2.13)
after forcing |X[i]− Y [i]| = 1.
And the weight functions
ωi(X,Y [i]) = (
3∑
k=1
|ξ(k)i |
p)
− 1
p , p < 0 (2.14)
are determined by ξ
(k)
i ’s, which are the correlations between the absolute values of cover
residuals and the absolute values of the change on cover residuals at ith pixel, after passing three
directional high-pass filters. So the design of WOW force the embedding more likely to change at
places with greater values of three directional residuals, which are edges or textures.
S-UNIWARD extends the distortion function defined in WOW to the frequency domain.
The word “UNIWARD” is short for the ”Universal Wavelet Relative Distortion” and “S” indicates
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the ”Spatial Domain” .The distortion function using in S-UNIWARD is defined as the sum of
relative changes between the highest wavelet coefficients of cover and stego images. In the design
of high-pass filters, S-UNIWARD uses the same kernels formed from 8-tap Daubechies wavelets as
WOW. While the distortion function for S-UNIWARD is not additive:
DX(Y ) =
3∑
k=1
∑
u,v
|W (k)uv (X)−W (k)uv (Y )|
σ + |W (k)uv (X)|
(2.15)
where σ = 1 is the stablizing constant, W
(k)
uv (X) is the uvth wavelet coefficient of X in the kth
sub-band of the first decomposition level, for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} representing three directions (horizontal,
vertical and diagonal directions).
MiPOD is another content-adaptive embedding algorithm for RGB images. Unlike the above
two algorithms, MiPOD does not solve the problem by starting with some particular forms of pixel
costs. Instead, this embedding first define the change probabilities βi at each pixel:
P(Y [i] = X[i] + 1) = βi,
P(Y [i] = X[i]− 1) = βi,
P(Y [i] = X[i]) = 1− 2βi
with 0 ≤ βn ≤ 13 , for a cover image X ∈ X
n and the associated stego image Y ∈ X n. Then the
additive distortion function is simply defined as:
DX(Y ) =
∑
X[i] 6=Y [i]
ωi (2.16)
where ωi is the cost of changing X[i] to Y[i], and it is determined by βi via:
βi =
exp(−λωi)
1 + 2exp(−λωi)
(2.17)
or
ωi =
1
λ
log(
1
βi
− 2) (2.18)
for some parameter λ related to the payload size.
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A numerical approximation to βi is introduced by “Minimizing the Power of Optimal Detector”
(which also defines the name of this algorithm), with a locally estimated Gaussian model based on
Fridrich and Kodovskỳ (2013).
2.2.3 Matrix Embedding and F5 and nsF5 Algorithms in the JPEG Domain
The standard F5 algorithm can be viewed as applying the matrix embedding into the DCT
coefficients of JPEG images, and the heart of matrix embedding is based on binary Hamming
codes, which is a coding scheme that decreases the number of changes and consequently increases
the steganographic security. Therefore, comparing to the LSB embedding, matrix embedding has
higher embedding efficiency, and in this case the efficiency is measured by the expected number of
random message bits embedded with one embedding change. More details of the matrix embedding
with Hamming coding can be found on Bierbrauer (1998).
F5 was first published in Westfeld (2001), and later a more secure algorithm nsF5 was developed
in Fridrich et al. (2007). F5 has been implemented in many mobile Apps, such as Pixelknot and
Passlok. When reading out the bits for the payload message, F5 skips over any grayvalue of zero.
A basic step for embedding a bit in F5 is to change the cover DCT LSB value to match the payload
bit. If the DCT coefficient value is one, and it gets changed to zero during the embedding process, it
is left as the value zero and then the next appropriate DCT value is used to embed the payload bit.
Thus, during embedding using F5, there is a small percentage of DCT coefficients that were changed
from non-zero to zero but do not hold any payload information. Thus, some DCT coefficients are
lost during the embedding process and this process is called shrinkage. As an improved version of
F5, nsF5 has fixed this problem by using the wet paper codes introduced in Fridrich et al. (2006).
2.3 Digital image Steganalysis
The forensic analysis of steganography is called steganalysis, and their relationship is like the
two slides of a coin. Steganalysis is the opposite to steganography. Its ultimate goal is to to discover
if hidden content is contained within the image, and, if so, to uncover further information about the
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hidden content. However, the majority of current research about steganography and steganalysis
has still focused on the first step yet, which is identifying or classifying an image as cover (innocent)
or stego (with hidden message). This step of steganalysis is called steg-detection.
2.3.1 Signature steganalysis
Signature-based steganalysis is a steganalytic method to examine the existence of any suspi-
cious repetitive fixed patterns (or signatures) in the given digital images. Many steganography
developers leave their traces somewhere in the output of their products. For example, accord-
ing to Karampidis et al. (2018), a online steganography called Jpegx, adds some fixed numbers
at the end of jpeg’s file marker. Similarly, the java code of standard F5 algorithm also stamp a
signature for every stego images they produce. Considering this fact, some steganalysis software
was developed by just checking the fixed patterns for those most popular embedding algorithms.
In Newman et al. (2019), two steg-detection software StegoHunt byWetStone Technologies (2017)
and DC3-StegoDetect byDC3 (2017) proved their ability of detecting stego images generated by
the standard F5 algorithm. Motivated by those results, we extend the usage of signatures to the
detection of stego apps, which can be found in detail at Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Statistical steganalysis
Unlike signature steganalysis relying on some “side information”, statistical steganalytic meth-
ods use certain statistics directly from the target images, to distinguish between cover images and
stego images, provided that the embedding algorithm is known and fully understood. As an exam-
ple, we introduce the procedure of histogram attack on LSB embedding by using the Chi-square test
on Pairs of Values (POVs), which were first defined and studied by Westfeld and Pfitzmann (1999).
In general, POVs can be applied to gray-scaled values, color pixel values, or DCT coefficients. In
the case of detecting LSB on an 8-bit gray-scaled image, all POVs are provided as the following
sets:
{0, 1}, {2, 3}, ..., {254, 255}
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in which each set refers to a POV, and all sets form a partition of the set of all intensity values
P = {0, 1, ..., 255}. Moreover, the POV sets are also the orbits of P under the LSB embedding
Algorithm 1:
LSB(2k + t) =

POV (2k + t) if LSB makes changes
2k + t if LSB does not make changes
(2.19)
where k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 27} , t ∈ {0, 1} and the POV (2k + t) is the corresponding pair of 2k + t in
its POV set, and it can be written as:
POV (2k + t) =

2k if t = 1
2k + 1 if t = 0
(2.20)
If we know the Permu({1, 2, ...,m}), without loss of generality, just assume {1, 2, ...m} is the
embedding path, then for any 2k + t in P , we can define the histogram of this element in the
embedding path of a stego image Y as:
h[2k + t] = |Y [i] = 2k + t, i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}| (2.21)
Let j be an even number, and {2j , 2j+1} := J any pair of values for LSB, define pXj as the
following ratio:
pXj =
∣∣X[i] = 2j , i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}∣∣
|X[i] ∈ J, i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}|
(2.22)
Then
pYj = α ∗ (1− pXj ) + (1− α) ∗ pXj (2.23)
where α is the probability of a potential value change caused by Algorithm 1. Since the design
of LSB embedding requires the message m to get values from {0, 1} in a random pattern, the
probability of changing a pixel value in the path of a cover image is also 12 . Therefore
pYj =
1
2
∗ (1− pXj ) +
1
2
∗ pXj =
1
2
(2.24)
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and we also expect
h[2k] ≈ h[2k + 1] ≈ h[2k] + h[2k + 1]
2
, for k ∈ 0, 1, ..., 27 − 1 (2.25)
in another word, for a fully embedded stego image, the histograms of pairs in each POV set are
same. Now let ĥ[2k] := h[2k]+h[2k+1]2 , and consider the Pearson chi-square statistic:
S =
27−1∑
k=0
(h[2k]− ĥ[2k])2
ĥ[2k]
(2.26)
then S approximately follows the chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 27 − 1 under
the assumption that h[2k] ≈ ĥ[2k] and ĥ[2k] > 4 for all k. Then setting some given threshold S0 for
S or type I error α, the Pearson’s chi-squared test can be applied to this hypothesis test problem
of identifying steganography :
H0 : h ∼ ĥ i.e. Y[1,2, ...m] is a fully embedded stego image.
H1 : h  ĥ i.e. Y[1,2, ...m] is a not fully embedded stego image.
The detail of selecting the threshold S0 and the experimental evaluation of the histogram attack
can be found at the original paper by Westfeld and Pfitzmann (1999).
2.3.3 Machine-Learning-based Steganalysis
As we mentioned above, without the knowledge of the generated path for hiding messages, even
for the simplest embedding algorithm the statistical histogram attack is not sufficient to detect the
stego images, especially for stego images with very low embedding rates, let alone other advanced
content-adaptive embedding algorithms. Fortunately, we still have another powerful weapon –
machine learning, which has been proved as a very successful method for both spatial domain and
frequency domain steganalysis. In this section, we give a short introduction to one of the well
known ML-steganalysis scheme, the rich models for feature extraction and the ensemble classifier
for classification. There are many other feature extraction methods in image steganalysis, and many
of them are obtained by dimension reduction of the original rich model design. For classification
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methods, Support Vector Machines (SVM), adaptive boosting and Deep Learning (DL) are also
widely applied, but the ensemble classifier is still the most efficient one. So in this section, we
give a short introduction to a Rich Model of noise residual and the ensemble classifier with Fisher
Linear Discriminants (FLDs). More details can be found from the original publications including
Kodovsky et al. (2012) and Fridrich and Kodovsky (2012).
2.3.4 Rich models
The words “Rich model” for building a high-dimensional feature space, are named to differen-
tiate from single models. Actually a rich model can be built by just merging many smaller single
models (or submodels). There are three steps to form a submodel:
• Computing residulas: The submodels are formed by noise residuals, without loss of gen-
erality, for an gray-scale digital image X ∈ {0, ..., 255}m×n, the noise residual of a submodel
at pixel location (i, j) can be defined as:
Ri,j = X̂i,j(Ni,j)− cXi,j
where Ni,j is a neighborhood of Xi,j , X̂i,j(Ni,j) is the approximated value to Xi,j , by using the
pixel values in the neighborhood Ni,j , and integer c ∈ N is called the order of residuals. For
example, Ri,j = Xi,j+1 −Xi,j is a first-order residual, and Ri,j = Xi,j−1 +Xi,j+1 − 2Xi,j is a
second-order residual. Besides, these two submodels are both linear in the horizontal direction.
Ri,j =min{Xi,j−1+Xi,j+1−2Xi,j , Xi+1,j+Xi−1,j−2Xi,j} is a second-order nonlinear residual.
• Truncation and quantization: For each submodel, noise residual Ri,j is quantized and
truncated with some parameter q > 0 and T :
Ri,j ← truncT
(
round
(
Ri,j
q
))
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• Co-occurrences: Based on the experience and resource, T = 2 is fixed, and that means
Ri,j ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}. Let d be a four dimensional tuple with range defined as:
d = (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}4
,
Then we have 54 = 625 elements in the space made up by all d ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}4
For a digital image X = (Xi,j) and the noise residual R = (Ri,j) of a submodel after the
truncation and quantization. Define the horizontal co-occurrence matrix C = (Cd) as:
Cd =
1
Z
|{(Ri,j , Ri,j+1, Ri,j+2, Ri,j+3) = d}|,
where Z is the normalization factor. By definition, the value stored in location index d is the
number of times the pattern (Ri,j , Ri,j+1, Ri,j+2, Ri,j+3) = (d1, d2, d3, d4) = d appears in the
residual image R. Similarly, the vertical co-occurrence can be defined in an analogical way.
For each q > 0, T = 2, each submodel yields 625+625=1250 dimensional feature space. The
design of spatial rich model suggest a bunch of high-pass filters, and quantization factor q as:
q ∈

{c, 1.5c, 2c}, c > 1
{1, 2}, c = 1
By using the symmetric properties, the collection of horizontal and vertical co-occurrence ma-
trices yields 34,671 features in total.
2.3.5 Ensemble Classifier
The general idea of a ensemble classifier is essentially a random forest consisting of L binary
classifiers called base learners, Bl, l = 1, ..., L, each trained on some random sub-dimensional space
with different dimension parameter dsub of the the feature space built by rich models. Finally the
ensemble reaches its decision by using all L decisions of individual base learners using a voting
function.
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In the original paper Kodovsky et al. (2012), the authors suggest to use the Fisher Linear
Discriminants (FLDs) as the fast base learners. The optimal number of base learners, L and the
dimension of each sub-feature-space dsub are determined and tuned during a bootstrap training
process. Let c ∈ {0, 1}, xcm ∈ Rd for m ∈ {1, ..., N tr} as training feature vectors and ym ∈ Rd for
m ∈ {1, ..., N ts} as test feature vectors, then the algorithm is summarized in Alg. 2. The detail of
tuning the parameter L and dsub can be found at the original publications.
Algorithm 2 Ensemble classifier with Parameters: L and dsub
1: for each l = 1 to L do
2: Form a random subspace:
3: Dl ⊂ {1, ..., d}, | Dl |= dsub < d
4: Form a bootstrap sample of {1, ..., N tr} : Nl
5: with |Nl| = N tr
6: Train a base learner Bl on features x
c,l
m ∈ RDl for m ∈ Nl
7: =⇒ get projection vector w and threshold b.
8: Make lth decision for all ylm ∈ RDl by:
Bl(y
l
m) =
{
1, wTylm > b
0, Otherwise
9: end for
10: Build the final decision B(ym) by the voting function:
11: B(ym) =
{
1,
∑L
l=1Bl(y
l
m) > L/2
0,
∑L
l=1Bl(y
l
m) > L/2
12: return B(ym)
2.4 Camera Identification by PRNU
The first study of applying the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) to the camera model
identification problems was attributed to Lukas et al. (2006). Later Chen et al. (2007) proposed a
revised statistical model to give a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the PRNU of image
data from the same camera source. Since then, many researchers have been working in this field
and one of the complete description of the latest progress is Fridrich (2013). In this section, we
only review the necessary background knowledge related to the next chapters.
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To begin with, instead of viewing a digital image, say X as an m× n matrix, we consider X as
a column vector in mn dimensional vector space. We define the normalized correlation for digital
images X and Y as the following:
corr(X,Y) =
(X− X̄) · (Y− Ȳ)
||X− X̄||||Y− Ȳ||
(2.27)
where || · || is the L2 vector norm, “ (·) ” is the mean value , and “ · ” is the inner product.
Let Y be the output gray-scale values of an digital image, K a matrix of the variations in
quantum efficiency among pixels, I the light intensity an imaging sensor is illuminated with, τD
the dark current, and c the programming offset to the dark current, then the statistical Pixel
Output Model is given as:
Y = I + IK + τD + c + Θ (2.28)
in which Θ represents the collection of all other noise sources not mentioned above.
Now apply a wavelet-based denoiser F to Y, and we get the noise residual W as:
W = Y− F (Y) (2.29)
Let Ξ denote the sum of all remaining noise after applying the denoiser F to the image Y ,
Ξ = I− F (Y) + τD + c + Θ (2.30)
which usually has large variance around the textured regions. Then we simplify the model as:
W = IK + Ξ (2.31)
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We note here that W is the noise residual after denoising, IK is the PRNU, and Ξ is some
random variable of other noise. Further, if we assume Ξ has a zero-mean normal distribution with
some fixed variance σ2i,j for each pixel location (i, j), then the maximum likelihood estimate for K
is:
K̂ =
∑d
k=1 IkWk∑d
k=1 I
2
k
(2.32)
where d is the sample size of given images from the same device. It is also easy to verify that
formula 2.32 also gives the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) with minimum variance for K. In
digital image forensics, K (or K̂ ) is usually viewed as camera sensor fingerprint, for it is quite stable
with respect to the changes of time and temperatures. For RGB images, PRNU can be estimated
for the color channels separately, and then the overall linear pattern of camera fingerprint estimate
can be computed as :
K̂ = 0.3K̂R + 0.6K̂G + 0.1K̂B (2.33)
The theoretical estimation of a camera fingerprint K relies on the true values of light intensity,
which are usually not available in practice. So Fridrich suggests to assume Ik = Yk or Ik = F (Yk)
because the PRNU term is weak comparing to other noise. The quality of a fingerprint is defined
by quality = corr(K, K̂), and the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound gives a lower bound of the variance
of K̂ :
V ar(K̂) ≥ σ
2∑d
k=1 I
2
k
(2.34)
where σ2 represents the additive noise levels for all pixel coordinates. So in practice, Fridrich
(2013) suggests to collect dozens of blue sky images to build the reference fingerprint for a camera
sensor, since the images of blue sky are usually bright and smooth . The normalized correlations
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between the noise residual of the single test image and the sensor fingerprint corr(W, K̂) has
been widely used to testify the source of the test image, if the target image has not been edited
or compressed. For the processed images, the Peak to Correlation Energy measure (PCE) can be
applied to identify the source of the images, and since in this thesis only raw images are discussed for
the camera identification problems, we omit the introduction of PCE here. For choice of denoiser F,
it is another story, as the development of denoising algorithms, many advanced denoising methods
have been applied to the camera source identification problems, but the original proposed wavelet-
based denoiser by Mihcak et al. (1999) is still one of the best algorithms for the source identification
problems.
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CHAPTER 3. TACKLING ANDROIDS STEGO APPS IN THE WILD
A paper published by Asia-Pacific Signal and Information Processing Association Annual
Summit and Conference, 2018.
Wenhao Chen, Li Lin, Min Wu, and Jennifer Newman
3.1 Abstract
Digital image forensics is a young but maturing field, encompassing key areas such as camera
identification, detection of forged images, and steganalysis. However, large gaps exist between aca-
demic results and applications used by practicing forensic analysts. To move academic discoveries
closer to real-world implementations, it is important to use data that represent “in the wild” scenar-
ios. For detection of stego images created from steganography apps, images generated from those
apps are ideal to use. In this paper, we present our work to perform steg detection on images from
mobile apps using two different approaches: “signature” detection, and machine learning methods.
A principal challenge of the ML task is to create a great many of stego images from different apps
with certain embedding rates. One of our main contributions is a procedure for generating a large
image database by using Android emulators and reverse engineering techniques, the first time ever
done. We develop algorithms and tools for signature detection on stego apps, and provide solutions
to issues encountered when creating ML classifiers.
3.2 Introduction
Digital image forensics is a term used in academia to describe the study of digital images for
camera identification, image forgery, and steganalysis. With the popularity of mobile devices,
camera identification and forgery detection are attracting research for more practical scenarios for
digital image forensics. Important challenges remain, however, to detect steganography “in the
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wild”, such as produced by mobile apps, and where academic research may provide impetus for
tool development.
In the penultimate case, evidence produced by a digital image forensic analysis for use in a
court of law will be held to the Daubert standard Stern (2017), and assessed for scientifically-based
reasoning and appropriate application to the facts.
Academic steganography and steganalysis techniques are very successful in the academic envi-
ronment using sophisticated embedding and detection methods and data typically collected from
digital still cameras Westfeld (2001); Fridrich et al. (2007); Pevny et al. (2010); Gou et al. (2007);
Kodovskỳ and Fridrich (2012); Kodovsky et al. (2012). While mobile phones appear as part of crim-
inal investigations on a regular basis, surprisingly, the authors found only one published research
on steganography detection where a mobile phone app was used to produce the stego images Chen
et al. (2018). This paper presents our results of the first in-depth investigation into detection of
stego images produced by a number of apps on mobile phones.
In the academic community, a machine learning classifier is the first choice for steganalysis,
and the algorithms are usually tested on a large database containing sufficient cover-stego pairs
of images. However, as discussed in Section 3.4, we show it is far from trivial to create appropri-
ate training and testing data from mobile stego apps to use in machine learning (ML) classifiers.
Moreover, unlike a published steganography algorithm, Android developers prefer using more so-
phisticated techniques, including a password for encryption or a secret preprocessing package, or
coding techniques such as obfuscation. The third challenge is the variety of devices and input
images for the apps, and ignoring the impact of the image source can cause unacceptable errors in
detection of stego images.
As Albert Einstein once said, in the middle of difficulty lies opportunity. For data collection,
we develop an Android camera app Chen (2017) that allows us to gather thousands of images by
one device in just several hours. By using the most advanced tools from program analysis Lam
et al. (2011); Bartel et al. (2012); Wísniewski and Tumbleson (2017), we make great efforts to
reverse-engineer many Android stego apps. In analyzing the code written by developers of stego
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app programs, we determine that, with few exceptions, most algorithms used to hide the message
are far from the advanced algorithms published in academic research papers. For example, some
of the app embedding algorithms were based on simple least significant bit (LSB) changes placed
in an lexicographical order in the image. Some apps provide little security, even if a complicated
embedding method was used, but strangely had a unique “signature” embedded, and make the
stego image and its app easily identifiable as such. These are opportunities to take advantage of,
and make steg detection easier.
Focusing on three phone models and six Android stego apps, we present answers to our funda-
mental question using signature-based detection and machine learning classifiers. While admittedly
these initial experiments are limited in scope, the experiments are soundly designed and provide the
first such deep study published using images from mobile phone apps. We note that there is a large
potential for security risks if these apps continue to be used, but lack effective detection. Table 3.2
shows 6 apps from the Google Play store, with a minimum of 1000 to 100,000 downloads each,
as of May 2018. Along with iPhone stego apps, as well as apps not posted including the recently
identified “MuslimCrypt” Motherboard (2018), there is evidence that steganography continues to
be a model of digital communication. Understanding how to detect stego images from stego apps
has potential to help accurately assess the rate that stego images occur “in the wild.”
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. In Section 3.3, we discuss the background
of steganography, how it is manifested in mobile apps, the general workflow of stego apps, and
the critical challenges in creating thousands of images from mobile apps to use in steganalysis.
Section 3.4 describes the important process of creating the image dataset for all our experiments,
including the non-trivial reverse-engineering procedure to generate the cover images corresponding
to the app-generated stego images. In Section 3.5, we present the results of the signature-based
detection of stego images from mobile apps, followed by results of the machine learning methods in
Section 3.6. Finally, in Section 3.7, we summarize our work and look ahead to future challenges.
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3.3 Background
3.3.1 Steganography
Steganography offers techniques to send a payload without revealing its presence in the medium
of communication. The focus of this paper is on digital images as the choice of medium for
steganography. Unlike encryption of information, digital image steganography takes a payload,
converts it to bits, and changes the bits of an image ever so slightly, so the changed image bits
match the payload bits. This process is typically done in a way to avoid visual distortions of the
image. In academic steganography, cover image is the term for an image in its form just prior to
embedding by a stego algorithm, and the term stego image refers to an image output with hidden
content. We call a message the bit string corresponding to the user-input content desired to be
communicated. It does not include passwords or other information generated by the app code,
such as length of the payload or bit locations, for example. The term embed is used to describe the
algorithmic process of changing a cover image’s bit values to represent the message bits. Typically,
the change in bit values by the embedding algorithm results in change in color (or gray) intensity
values by at most one. This leaves the overall visual content looking “normal” to human vision.
We use the term payload to describe the combination of message, password, string length indicators
and all other bit values that the app eventually embeds into the digital image. The payload size is
the number of bits needed to represent the payload.
Many steganography algorithms exist to hide a payload in an image. One of the most common
steganography algorithms uses the least significant bit values for embedding, and is adopted by
many stego apps. Figure 3.2 provides an example of one simple LSB-replacement embedding for a
grayscale image in the spatial domain, in which all the changes are highlighted by bold numbers.
In the stego images, the LSB values of the cover images are replaced by the payload bits.
To make the payload more secure when embedding, a developer can follow additional steps.
First, the payload bits themselves can be encrypted with a user-input, so that even if they are
retrieved, the key is necessary for decrypting the payload. Second, the pixel locations where the
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Figure 3.1 Bit plane representation for an 8-bit image.
payload bits are embedded can be selected in a random order, again using a key. As we will show
in the following subsections, some stego apps use variations of the above methods to improve their
level of security.
3.3.2 General Workflow of the Embedding Process in Stego Apps
Although different stego apps may use different algorithms to create the stego images, they
have many common features in their user interfaces. The user-input for stego apps include: (1) the
input image, and (2) the message or file to be embedded, and optionally (3) the password. The
output stego image is usually in PNG or JPEG format, depending on the image domain in which
the payload is embedded. Figure 3.3 shows the general workflow of an embedding process in a stego
app. Overall, an embedding process involves the following steps:
1. Decode domain values of input image;
2. Pre-process the domain values;
3. Pre-process the message;
4. Create and embed payload, and output stego image.
First, the user-input image is decoded into a bitmap of pixel values, and transformed into
domain values. For spatial domain embedding, each domain value represents the RGB color and
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Figure 3.2 An example of LSB embedding in the spatial domain.
Alpha value of each pixel. For frequency domain embedding, the domain values represent the
quantized DCT coefficients in the JPEG file. Additionally, the app may resize the cover image
for different purposes such as reducing computational complexity, or increasing the cover image
capacity.
Stego programs pre-process the message differently, such as encrypting the message before
embedding to enhance security. Some stego programs attach signature strings or message length
information so that the embedded message can be faithfully extracted by the receiver. A signature-
based steg detection approach relies largely on the existence of the signature strings and length
information. We provide more details on the signature-based detection approach in Section 3.5.
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Figure 3.3 General Workflow of an Embedding Process.
3.3.3 Steganalysis for Stego Images from Android Apps
Steganalysis has two main steps: first, to discover if hidden payload is contained within the
image, and, if so, extract and decrypt the hidden message. The vast majority of papers in the
academic community has so far focused on classifying an image as cover (innocent) or stego (with
hidden content). Machine learning (ML) has proved to be a successful method in classifying cover-
stego pairs in academic settings. A typical ML framework for steganalysis includes a labeled image
database, a corresponding feature space to represent the images, and a classification algorithm to
separate the stego images from the clean images. The performance of a ML algorithm can be
evaluated by the average misclassification rate for targeted images with a certain embedding rate,
where the embedding rate is defined as:
# of bits to represent the payload
# of the bits available to hide the payload (capacity)
One of the most popular image datasets in the academic community is BOSSbase Bas et al.
(2011), in which there are more than 10,000 cover images from seven digital still cameras. Using
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this dataset, steganalysts develop new algorithms to create stego images in a more secure way by
sending the cover-stego pairs they create through advanced stego detectors. Most studies limit
their cases to the balanced database scenario, in which the number of stego images is equal to the
number of cover images, since under the assumption of balanced data, the average error rate of
classification is sufficient to represent the performance of a steganalyzer. That is, if we let PMD
denote the percentage of misdetections and PFA the percentage of false alarms, then for a dataset
constituting 50% cover images and 50% stego images, the average error rate PE for the detection
is defined as:
PE =
1
2
(PMD + PFA). (3.1)
However, the scenario for detecting stego images created by mobile apps is different. First,
unlike academic embedding algorithms or scripts which are capable of controlling the embedding
rate by directly generating bit streams as payloads, a stego app encrypts real text together with
a password (when available) into a bit stream as a payload for the target image. This means it is
not trivial to generate a large amount of stego images at a specific embedding rate. Second, as we
can see from Fig. 3.3, an input image provided by the user is processed before the embedding step
in many of the stego apps, and therefore an input image is not necessarily the cover image in the
traditional definition. Different stego apps apply different tools to process the input images into
different image objects. In this paper, we view an image after the pre-processing procedure without
any payload embedded as the cover image. In this way, a cover image is a clean image produced
by the same processing libraries applied to its stego pair, and the cover-stego pairs will have the
same visual property that human eyes cannot tell the difference. Extracting a cover image as an
intermediate output from a stego app is another challenge, and the details of creating cover images
by reverse engineering are presented in the next section.
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Table 3.1 Summary of Original Images collected from 3 smartphones
Source Device # Scenes JPEG DNG
OnePlus 5 120 1200 1200
Pixel1 187 1870 1870
Samsung S7 114 1140 1140
Overall 421 4210 4210
3.4 Generating Stego Image Dataset
Since this is the first in-depth study on Android stego apps, a benchmarking database of images
created by stego apps is essential. With real world stego apps, there are a few challenges we need
to address when generating the dataset: (1) the absence of source code makes it non-trivial to
analyze the apps; (2) in the scenario where the input image is transformed (e.g. downsampled)
prior to embedding, the corresponding cover image is not saved by the app. In this section, we
first describe the procedure of original image collection, in which we developed a camera app to
achieve reliable and controlled image capture. We then explain our manual process of analyzing
the stego app binaries to gain the ground truth of the apps’ embedding process. Lastly, we explain
the batch cover/stego image generation process that efficiently generates a large set of cover/stego
image pairs using binary instrumentation.
3.4.1 Collection of original images
With the goal of studying Android apps, three mobile devices have been purchased: a Google
Pixel, a Samsung Galaxy S7, and a OnePlus 5. To better understand and control the quality
of images captured by smartphone cameras, we develop an Android app named “Cameraw” Chen
(2017) to collect original images. Cameraw allows us to take a group of ten pairs of images consisting
of the DNG format and the JPEG format at same time, for each fixed scene with various exposure
parameters in one click.
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Table 3.1 summarizes the original images captured for this study. A total of 421 different scenes
of JPEG and DNG images were collected across all three devices. These original images are used
to generate stego images from the 6 stego apps, which we introduce next.
3.4.2 Generation of cover and stego images
3.4.2.1 Real-world Android Stego Apps
To generate the stego images and their corresponding covers, we have chosen 6 of the most
popular stego apps from the Google Play Store, shown in Table 3.2. We remark that the app
Steganography M Mexnik (2014) is actually named “Steganography” on Google Play Store. We
append the letter M, which is the first letter of the author’s name, to distinguish the app with
the many other stego apps also named “Steganography” on Google Play Store. As shown in the
“Output Format” column, 1 of the 6 apps produce stego images in JPEG format while the other
5 produce PNGs. The output format indicates the use of frequency domain embedding (JPEG) or
spatial domain embedding (PNG). The “Open Source” column shows that only 2 apps have their
source code publicly available, which makes the app analysis process non-trivial for the remaining
four apps. We explain our process of reverse-engineering non-open source stego apps next.
Table 3.2 Six selected stego apps from Google Play Store
App Name # Installs Output Format Open Source
PixelKnot 100,000 - 500,000 JPEG yes
Steganography Master 10,000 - 50,000 PNG no
Steganography M 10,000 - 50,000 PNG no
Da Vinci Secret Image 5,000 - 10,000 PNG no
PocketStego 1,000 - 5,000 PNG no
MobiStego 1,000 - 5,000 PNG yes
3.4.2.2 Reverse engineering Android stego apps
For the 4 stego apps that are not open source, we utilize several Android program analysis tools
to achieve reverse engineering. Given a stego app, we first use Apktool Wísniewski and Tumbleson
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Table 3.3 Characteristics of the embedding process in 6 stego apps
App Name Embedding Domain Image Resizing
Payload Pre-processing
Embedding Path Embedding Technique
Encryption Signature String Length Data
PixelKnot frequency downsampling yes no yes pseudo-random F5
Steganography Master spatial no no yes no lexicographical Base 10 LSDa
Steganography M spatial no no yes yes pseudo-random LSB
DaVinci Secret Image spatial user-controlled no yes yes lexicographical Alpha channel encoding
PocketStego spatial downsampling no yes no lexicographical LSB
MobiStego spatial downsampling yes yes no regional lexicographical RGB channels LS2B
a Least Significant Digit replacement in base 10: replaces the “ones” digit in the cover image with one of the 3 base 10 digits of the message character, in each R-G-B planes.
(2017), a reverse engineering tool for Android, to decode the program binaries and resource files
from the app’s APK file. The program binaries are decoded into an intermediate code format
called Smali. The resources files are decoded into XML files that contain information about the
app’s graphical user interface (GUI). Next, we install and run the stego app on an Android device
to test its user interface. We inspect the app’s GUI structure while clicking through different
screens, and use UIAutomator uia (2017), an Android GUI testing tool, to retrieve the resource
IDs for different GUI widgets. Using the resource IDs, we then identify the GUI widget (usually
a button named “Embed”) that initiates the embedding procedure, and locate the corresponding
event handler method in the Smali code. After the core embedding algorithm code is located, we
manually inspect the code to understand the key characteristics of the embedding algorithm.
Our goal of reverse engineering stego apps, is to study the following characteristics of an em-
bedding algorithm, so that we may batch-generate image data for our experiments:
• Embedding Domain. The image domain in which the payload is embedded, either fre-
quency domain or spatial domain.
• Image Resizing. Indicates resizing of the cover image prior to embedding. Stego apps can
downsize the input image to reduce computation time, or upscale the input image to increase
image capacity.
• Payload Pre-processing. The process that transforms the user input message into payload
bits prior to embedding. For example, the input message can be encrypted, or appended with
a signature string or length data.
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• Embedding Path. The order in which the domain values are visited to embed the payload.
Some apps use simple lexicographical embedding paths, while others use pseudo-random
embedding paths with the user password as a seed.
• Embedding Technique. How the payload is embedded into the domain values. Common
embedding techniques are LSB embedding in the spatial domain and F5 embedding Westfeld
(2001) in the frequency domain. However, some of the apps we reverse-engineered have
adopted their own unique embedding techniques.
Table 3.3 shows the embedding characteristics of the 6 stego apps we reverse engineered. Note
that “user controlled” in the column “Image Resizing” means the app lets the user decide the
output image size. In the sub-columns of “Payload Pre-processing,” “yes” or “no” indicates the
existence of payload processing steps.
The “Embedding Domain” column shows that PixelKnot embeds payload into the DCT coeffi-
cients of the frequency domain, while the others embed payload in the spatial domain.
The “Image Resizing” column shows that 2 out of 6 apps do not resize the cover image, while 3
apps may downsample the input image. The app DaVinci Secret Image allows the user to choose
the image size from several options, including the option to maintain the original size.
The “Payload Pre-processing” column shows the three possible payload pre-processing options:
encryption, signature string attachment, and length data attachment. Our investigation shows that
prior to the embedding process, 3 apps perform encryption on the input message, 6 apps append
signatures strings to the payload, and 3 apps append length data to the payload. While none of
the apps perform all three payload pre-processing options, every app will attach at least either a
signature string or a length information string to the payload. Such attachment to the payload is
necessary for the app’s extraction process, to identify the beginning and the end of the payload
and correctly extract the message. However, it can leave patterns in the stego images that allow
detection. We provide a detailed study on signature-based steg detection in Section 3.5.
The “Embedding Path” column shows that 3 apps embed the payload along pseudo-random
paths, while the others use fixed embedding paths. The pseudo-random embedding path is gener-
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ated by a pseudo-random number generator using the user input password as seed. The embedding
path can be recreated using the same seed. The lexicographical embedding path starts from the
top left of the image, and proceeds row by row or column by column sequentially. The app MobiS-
tego uses a “regional lexicographical” order, where the cover image and payload are first split into
multiple blocks, then a portion of payload bits is embedded into each block lexicographically.
The “Embedding Technique” column shows the variety of embedding techniques in the chosen
apps. The frequency domain embedding app PixelKnot is based on the academic embedding
algorithm F5. Out of the 5 spatial domain embedding apps, only Steganography M and PocketStego
use the standard LSB Replacement, while DaVinci Secret Image encodes the payload into alpha
channel values. MobiStego embeds 6 bits of payload into a single pixel by replacing the two least
significant bits of all three RGB channels, and Steganography Master embeds 8 bits of payload into
one pixel by changing the decimal digit of each pixel’s RGB value.
Table 3.4 Summary of Stego Images generated for 6 Stego Apps
Stego App Input Format Output Format # Input #Stegos # Covers
PixelKnot JPEG+DNG JPEG 8420 42100 8420
Steganography Master PNG PNG 8420 42100 8420
Steganography M PNG PNG 8420 42100 8420
DaVinci Secert Image PNG PNG 8420 42100 8420
PocketStego PNG PNG 8420 42100 8420
MobiStego PNG PNG 8420 42100 8420
Overall 50520 252600 50520
3.4.2.3 Batch Image Generation through Instrumentation
To achieve the goal of batch-generating stego images with fixed embedding rates while saving
the intermediate cover images, we use binary instrumentation to change the apps’ binaries to
generate cover/stego pairs. The binary instrumentation is achieved by first decoding the APK file
into Smali code, then modifying the Smali code to add functionalities, and finally compiling the
modified Smali code back to an APK file using Apktool Wísniewski and Tumbleson (2017). Through
instrumentation, we add two necessary functionalities to the stego apps: (1) saving the intermediate
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cover image along with its stego image pair, (2) automatically repeating the embedding process for
all the input images.
Saving Intermediate Cover Images. As previously mentioned in Section 3.3.3, statistical
steganalysis benefits from having cover/stego pairs that went through the same image processing
steps except for the embedding. However, real world stego apps, as shown in Table 3.3, often
preprocess the input image, which makes the ideal “cover” image unavailable. The implementation
of the functionality of saving the covers varies and depends on the specific stego app. We achieved
this in two ways: (1) modify the app’s embedding function so that it accepts “empty payloads,” in
which case the produced stego image is equivalent to the cover image, or (2) add a new function to
the stego app that can take the pre-embedding clean image data as input, and produce an image
that has the same encoding or compression format as the stego image.
Batch Cover/Stego Generation. This functionality is necessary for processing the large
amount of input images in our dataset in a timely manner. Each stego app has an added script
module that recursively scans through folders of input images and calls the app’s existing embedding
functions to generate cover/stego pairs. Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code of the batch cover/stego
generation script. The script has 3 inputs: a set of clean images, a dictionary pool for the input
message, and a set of target embedding rates. For each input image, the script first pre-processes
the image and saves the intermediate cover (Lines 2-3). The image capacity is then calculated (Line
4). Lines 6-13 generate messages with different target embedding rates and create stegos. For each
target embedding rate, we first calculate the length of the embedded payload lp, then calculate
the length of the input message lm based on the knowledge acquired from reverse engineering the
app. We then take a random segment of the dictionary with exact length lm, and proceed to call
the app’s embedding function. Relevant stego information and statistics, including the message,
password, embedding rate, change rate, etc., are also stored along with the stego image in the
database. Our large message dictionary contains text from 34 complete plays by Shakespeare.
Table 3.4 shows the details of the stego images batch-generated from the 6 stego apps, using
images in Table 3.1 as input.
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Algorithm 3 Pseudo Code of Cover/Stego Generation Script
Input: input images, dictionary, embedding rates
1: for each image in input images do
2: cover ← Preprocess(image)
3: SaveImage(cover)
4: c← Capacity(cover)
5: for each rate in embedding rates do
6: lp← c× rate . embedded payload length
7: lm← Calculate(lp) . input message length
8: message← GetMessage(dictionary, lm)
9: password← GetPassword
10: payload← Preprocess(message, password)
11: stego← Embed(cover, payload)
12: SaveImage(stego)
13: SaveStegoInfo(message, password)
14: end for
15: end for
16: return
For the frequency domain app PixelKnot, we use the original JPEG and DNG images to generate
stegos. For the other five spatial domain apps, we create PNG images that are center-cropped from
the JPEG and DNG images, to reduce embedding time. For each input image, a total of 30 stego
images are generated, including 5 stego images (with different embedding rates) from each of the 6
stego apps. The corresponding cover images for the stego images are also included in the dataset.
In the next two sections, we present our study on signature-based steganalysis and machine learning
steganalysis using the generated stego image dataset.
3.5 Signature-based Steg Detection
This section provides a study on signature-based steg detection. We first discuss the definition
of signatures, then analyze the signatures in the embedding process of 4 stego apps, and present
the signature-based detection results on stego images from the 4 apps.
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3.5.1 Embedding Signatures
In the context of this paper, a signature is a fixed pattern in the stego image that is unrelated
to the cover image. In general, there are two types of embedding signatures: (1) fixed data written
into fixed locations in the file headers, and (2) fixed data embedded into fixed locations in the
image domain. As an example of signature type (1), the academic embedding algorithm F5 writes
comment messages into the JPEG file header, and uses a specific bit in the JFIF header Hamilton
(2004) to indicate the existence of user comments. Signature type (2) appears more frequently in
our surveyed apps such as DaVinci Secret Image and Steganography Master, where a fixed string
pattern is embedded into fixed pixel locations.
The main reason that such signatures exist is to provide auxiliary information for the extraction
of payload. The extraction process requires auxiliary information, such as length data or fixed
signature strings, to identify the beginning and ending of the embedded payload. Subsequently,
embedding signatures can be used to identify stego images and even potentially extract the payload.
As previously mentioned in Section 3.4.2.2, we use reverse engineering techniques to analyze
the embedding algorithms from stego apps. As shown in Table 3.3, since the 2 apps PixelKnot,
Steganography M use pseudo-random embedding paths, their signature strings and length data are
not in embedded in fixed locations. The other 4 apps Steganography Master, DaVinci Secret Image,
PocketStego, and MobiStego each use a fixed lexicographical embedding path, which indicates a
possible signature. Next, we analyze the embedding signatures of 4 stego apps and introduce our
signature-based detection method.
3.5.2 Signature-based Detection Approach
The formats of embedded payload of the 4 stego apps are shown in Fig 3.4. Each app has a
different way of converting the user input message and/or password into the embedded payload.
Attached to the messages and passwords are two types of data: (1) signature strings which are
represented with label “$”, (2) length data, which is only used by DaVinci. The app Steganography
Master joins the password and input message in plaintext and surrounds them with two pairs of
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fixed signature strings. The embedded payload in DaVinci consists of three segments: the signature
string, the password in plaintext, and the message in plaintext. Each segment is also prefixed with a
length data whose value is the number of bits of the segment. The app MobiStego first encrypts the
input message using the password, then surrounds the encrypted message with a pair of signature
strings. The app PocketStego only appends a short 8-bit signature string at the end of the plaintext
message.
To utilize the signature strings for steg detection, we also must know the apps’ embedding
paths and embedding techniques. The embedding path determines the pixel locations in which the
signature string is embedded, and the embedding technique determines the insertion and extraction
of bits into the pixel values. Given that all 4 stego apps use lexicographical embedding paths, and
that 3 of them have fixed-length signature data at the start of the payload, we can identify the
pixel locations that may contain unique signature data.
The embedding techniques of the 4 stego apps have been reverse engineered, as shown in Ta-
ble 3.3. Steganography Master first turns each 8 bits of payload into a decimal number ranging
from 0 to 255. The 3 digits of the decimal number then replace the least significant base 10 digits
of a pixel’s R, G, B decimal values, respectively. DaVinci embeds 1 payload bit per pixel by setting
the pixel’s alpha value to 254 if the payload bit is 0, or to 255 if the payload bit is 1. MobiStego
embeds 6 payload bits per pixel by replacing the least significant two bits of all three RGB values.
PocketStego uses the standard LSB Replacement embedding where each payload bit overwrites a
pixel’s LSB in the blue channel only.
With the knowledge of the signature strings, embedding paths, and embedding techniques
from the 4 stego apps, we implement 4 stego detection functions. Each stego detection function
corresponds to one of the stego apps. Each detection function takes a test image as input, and
outputs a decision on whether the test image is a stego image produced by a specific stego app.
The decision is made by extracting the embedded bits based on the stego app’s embedding pattern,
and checking whether the extracted payload matches the correct payload format. Next, we present
our experimental results on signature-based steg detection.
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3.5.3 Experimental Result
The image dataset for this experiment contains 202,080 images including 168,400 stego images
and 33,680 cover images from the 4 stego apps: Steganography Master, DaVinci Secret Image,
MobiStego, and PocketStego. The test results are shown in Table 3.5. For each detector, the test
data is grouped into two categories: (1) stego images generated from this stego app (labeled as SM,
DV, MS, PS for short), and (2) all other images, including cover images and stego images from
the other 3 stego apps. The detection results for the two groups of data are shown separately for
each stego detector. As the results show, the 3 stego detectors for Steganography Master, DaVinci
Secret Image, and MobiStego correctly identify all stego images generated from their corresponding
apps, while correctly distinguishing these stego images from cover images and other stego images.
While the PocketStego detector has correctly identified all the PocketStego stego images, it also
mis-identifies the majority of the other images.
Table 3.5 Results of Signature-based Steg Detection
Stego App Test Images Image Count Accuracy
Steganography Master
SM Stego Images 42,100 100%
Other Images 159,980 100%
DaVinci Secret Image
DV Stego Images 42,100 100%
Other Images 159,980 100%
MobiStego
MS Stego Images 42,100 100%
Other Images 159,980 100%
PocketStego
PS Stego Images 42,100 100%
Other Images 159,980 0.23%
The prefect results for Steganography Master, DaVinci Secret Image, and MobiStego detectors
are as expected, as these apps have very distinctive signature strings in their payload. For example,
as shown in Fig 3.4, Steganography Master has two fixed signature strings (112 bits in total),
DaVinci Secret Image has 64 bits of distinct signature strings, and MobiStego has 24 bits of distinct
signature strings, at the beginning of their payloads. On the other hand, PocketStego has only one
8-bit signature string at the end of the payload, without a fixed location. This “weak” signature
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can be found in not only the stego images from PocketStego, but also randomly occurs in 99.77%
of other images as well, resulting in very poor accuracy.
Our test results demonstrate that it is possible to detect real world stego images based on
app embedding signatures. The advantage of signature-based steg detection is that, by looking for
known signatures in a test image, it can reliably identify stego images, and perhaps even extract the
embedded payload. However, signature-based steg detection relies on the uniqueness of signature
strings.
If the developer changes the signature string with an update of the app, then it is possible the
new signature will not be detected. A longer signature string with more patterns can provide better
detection than shorter signatures. Furthermore, determination of the pattern of the signature string
from the app binaries is not a trivial process, especially when the app has anti-analysis features
such as obfuscation or native code. Our future work on signature-based detection is to automate
the process of extracting signatures from stego apps using program analysis methods.
3.6 Detecting Stego Images by Machine Learning
Although we achieve near perfect results for detecting stego apps with distinctive signatures,
many stego apps do not write any signature to the images they create. For those apps with-
out signatures, we use machine learning methods. In this section, two Android apps, PixelKnot
and Steganography M, are selected for our studies, using two well-known methods: the F5 al-
gorithm, and spatial LSB embedding. To our knowledge, this is the first time a ML detection
algorithm is applied to identify stego images generated by mobile stego apps. We implement the
CC-JRM Kodovskỳ and Fridrich (2012) for feature extraction on JPEG images and SRM Fridrich
and Kodovsky (2012) for feature extraction on PNG images. The FLD ensemble classifer Kodovsky
et al. (2012) performs the classification.
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3.6.1 Case Study - PixelKnot
PixelKnot The Guandian Project (2017) is an Android app that uses a modified version of the
embedding algorithm F5 Westfeld (2001) and it outputs a stego image in JPEG format. Before
embedding, PixelKnot downsamples the input image if its size exceeds 1280*1280. The message is
encrypted using one part of the password, while the other part of the password is used as seed for
the F5 algorithm to generate a pseudo-random embedding path.
3.6.1.1 Experiments and Results
The goal of our first experiment is to study if the academic ML methods can be applied to
detect the stego images created by PixelKnot. For every selected original image (DNG or JPEG),
PixelKnot loads the standard Picasso package to downsample this larger image into a smaller bitmap
object, which can be viewed as a 8-bit image in the spatial domain1. Cover and stego images with
different embedding rates are generated from all original images by reverse engineering as discussed
in the previous section. To evaluate the performance of the classic ML method, we implement
CC-JRM and FLD ensemble classifiers for feature extraction and classification, respectively.
To give the first impression of ML detector for stego apps, for every device, we randomly select
850 original JPEG images as the input, and create the cover-stego pairs from those originals. We
use 500 for training, and 350 for testing. The results are presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 Detecting stego images created by PixelKnot with 10% payload. (input images
are JPEG, training sample size=500 and test sample size=350)
Data Source Original Image Size Avg. Error Rate
Google Pixel 4048 × 3036 1.0%
Samsung Galaxy S7 4032 × 3024 7.6%
OnePlus 5 4608 × 3456 0.3%
Mixture of above three devices Flexible 3.2%
As we can see from the Table 3.6, when the image data sources are fixed, the results are quite
encouraging. Even in the case when we mix the images from all three devices, the average error
1We use grayscale images in our experiments.
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rate is just about 3%. Table 3.6 shows that with the knowledge of the suspect image data source,
for a fixed embedding rate, an academic ML based detection method works well in detecting the
stego images generated from PixelKnot.
We point out that the results in Table 3.6 are based on the assumption that we have knowledge
of the source devices of the suspected images. However, this is not typical in a real-world scenario.
The scenario when the source of the target image is not in the training database is called the
cover-source-mismatch problem in steganalysis Kodovskỳ et al. (2014). Table 3.7 lists the results
in the case when the sources of test images are not involved in the training database.
Table 3.7 Detecting stego images created by PixelKnot with 10% payload, in the cov-
er-source-mismatch case, where the training sample size=500 and test sample
size=350, and the testing source is not represented in the training data.
Test Data Source Training Data Source Avg. Error Rate
Google Pixel Samsung Galaxy s7 & OnePlus 5 1.3%
Samsung Galaxy s7 Google Pixel & OnePlus 5 40.0%
OnePlus 5 Google Pixel & Samsung Galaxy s7 35.7%
In Table 3.7, the average error rates are not at the same level for the three cover-source-mismatch
cases. Although the error in testing images from Google Pixel is almost as low as the error in Table
3.6, the error rates of detecting stego images from the other two devices when they are out of the
training datasets, are much greater than those in Table 3.6. Our preliminary results show that it
is not desirable to use only one or two devices to build a classifier for blind detection on multiple
devices. Thus, knowing the source of the target images in detecting stego apps will significantly
reduce the error rate for a ML based analyzer.
In the previous experiment, the embedding rate is fixed at 10% for all stego images we created.
To study the possibility of detecting stego images that have different embedding rates, we use the
previous input images collected from Google Pixel to generate three more sets of stego images with
three different embedding rates: 5%, 15% and 20%. For each subset, we build a stego classifier for
a fixed embedding rate. The results are presented in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8 Average error rates for detecting stego images created by PixelKnot with differ-
ent payload sizes.
Training Set:
5% Stego 10% Stego 15 % Stego 20% Stego
Test Set:
5% Stego 7.9% 41.4% 47.9% 49.6%
10% Stego 4.7% 1.0% 12.9% 39.3%
15% Stego 3.9% 0.9% 0.4% 2.86%
20% Stego 4.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%
In Table 3.8, for the same test data, the lowest error rate always occurs in the diagonal entries, for
which the training stego images have the same embedding rate as the images for testing. Another
interesting phenomenon is that the many error values located above the diagonal are extremely
high, while error values below the diagonal look acceptable. Table 3.8 gives us an impression that
it may be possible to apply well-trained stego classifiers based on 5% embedding rate to suspect
images having unknown payloads. We have to admit that this conclusion is limited to the case
when all images are from only one mobile phone, which is the Google Pixel, and it is left to future
research for the verification by larger-scale experiments for a variety of sources.
The performance of a ML based steg detector can depend on the training sample size and the
embedding rate for the target data. To test this, with the Google Pixel data, we use four
different sample sizes for the training set, at four different embedding rates, and average the error
rate over 10 different random drawings of the training data. The results are shown in Fig. 3.5 and
Fig. 3.6. It is clear from both figures that as the embedding rate increases, the average error rate
decreases, for all sample sizes. Also, increasing the size of the training set slightly reduces the error,
especially when the embedding rate is very low. Furthermore, because PixelKnot preprocesses and
downsamples the input images, the choice for the format of input image, JPEG or DNG, does not
cause a significant difference between the results for the two experiments.
3.6.2 Case Study - Steganography M
To study how well a ML detection method works in the case when stego images are created
by spatial domain embedding algorithms, we run our second case study for the app Steganog-
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raphy M Mexnik (2014). Steganography M is an Android stego app that uses spatial domain
embedding with pseudo-random embedding paths and implements an embedding algorithm very
similar to the standard LSB spatial embedding. From the clues we found during the program
analysis, we know that the cover image is not resized before embedding, and the pseudo-random
embedding path is generated from the user password.
3.6.2.1 Experiments and Results
Since there is no preprocessing of the image data by Steganography M, the noise levels of input
images can affect the detection results significantly. For that reason, two original image formats,
JPEG and DNG, are used in this case study. However, with limited time and resources, we use
cropped grayscale PNG images with dimension 512 × 512 from original images as the input images.
One benefit of such a choice is that feature extraction for smaller images is much more efficient.
Another important reason is that using processed PNG images for the input can be viewed as clean
cover images, since they are not compressed or downsampled by the app. With the help of Google
Android emulator, we create thousands of stego images with varied embedding rates for all original
images, both JPEG and DNG, collected by the app Cameraw installed on all three devices.
In this experiment, SRM and ensemble classifiers are applied for feature extraction and classi-
fication, respectively. For each fixed embedding rate, we randomly select a sample of images for
training and then test the classifier on another sample. Table 3.9 provides the result when JPEG
images are used to generate the inputs. As we can see from Table 3.9, when original images are in
JPEG format, the ML based steg detectors work so well that even for a very low embedding rate
(< 5%), the error rates are never above 3% for all devices.
As we did for Pixelknot, the results of training on one embedding rate and detecting with
different embedding rates is summarized in Table 3.10. In this experiment, only JPEG images
from Google Pixel are used to generate input images, and for every classifier, 500 random pairs
of cover-stego images are used for training, 350 for testing. The results in Table 3.10 are very
similar to what we concluded for the app Pixelknot. However, as we mentioned above, there is no
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Table 3.9 Detecting stego images created by Steganography M .Original images are JPEG,
training sample size = 500, test sample size = 350.
Data Source Embedding Rate Avg. Error Rate
Google Pixel
3% 0.4%
5% 0.0%
8% 0.0%
Samsung Galaxy S7
3% 1.3%
5% 0.9%
8% 0.4%
OnePlus 5
3% 2.7%
5% 1.4%
8% 1.0%
Table 3.10 Average error rates for detecting stego images created by Steganography M
with different payload sizes.
Training Set:
2% Stego 3% Stego 5 % Stego 7% Stego
Test Set:
2% Stego 2.9% 28.4% 48.0% 49.6%
3% Stego 2.4% 0.4% 0.6% 28.4%
5% Stego 2.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0.1%
7% Stego 2.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
preprocessing procedure for the input images by Steganography M. As a result, compared to using
JPEG as the data source, the noisy DNG images significantly increases the detection errors. To
illustrate this phenomenon, using the device Google Pixel, we randomly select 350 JPEG images
and 350 DNG images to create cover-stego pairs as the test dataset at different embedding rates,
repeat ten times, and for each time and each embedding rate, we create the corrsponding training
datasets with four different sample sizes. The results, as shown in Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8, show that
using the DNG images to generate the input images for Steganography M produces higher error
from a ML classifier. Moreover, even with 1000 cover-stego pairs for training and a high embedding
rate of 15%, the error of misclassification is at a minimum of 16% for DNG images from one phone.
Our experiments show that the knowledge of stego apps’ embedding algorithm can be beneficial
for stego detection. In both experiments, we assume that we have the knowledge of the app that
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created stego images. But this is not common in practice, as we may have very little information
about which stego apps were used. To improve the feasibility of machine learning based detection,
our future work includes: (1) analyzing and studying more real world stego apps, and (2) exploring
the possibility of training with one known app and detecting stego images from a different app.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze six Android apps that implement steganography algorithms. A major
contribution of this paper is our procedure to analyze the code in the app by applying reverse-
engineering techniques to the binary code. We use instrumentation techniques to perform the
non-trivial task to batch-generate cover-stego image pairs for machine learning steganalysis. Thus,
with appropriate numbers of images, we create machine learning classifiers and perform successful
steganalysis on stego images created from two mobile apps. We also present a detailed analysis
of four stego apps that contain a signature, and perform steg detection on these images. While
this is currently done in a manual process, our future efforts will investigate methods to automate
the program analysis of app code. Another challenge is to go beyond the task of identifying stego
or innocent images: the extraction of hidden contents. A program analysis approach can also be
useful to solve this problem. Another future challenge we plan to implement are other learning
paradigms, including deep learning.
3.8 Appendix: Blind Detection on Image Created by other Apps
In the previous discussion, we focus on the case studies on two Android apps, one for frequency
domain embedding, and one for spatial domain embedding. In both cases, we assume that we have
the knowledge of the app that create stego images. But this is not common in practise. In most
cases, we may only have little information about the stego apps. To explore the possibility that
if we can use one well-known app to detect the stego images created by another one, we find two
more apps are to carry on the further experiments.
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The first app is called “Passlok”, it has the same input and output formats as Pixelknot does,
and it claims to implement the F5 embedding algorithm. The default output JPEG quality for
images created by Passlok is 75, while the default quality for Pixelknot is 90. To reduce this
side effect, we change this quality parameter from 75 to 90, and send 1000 same JPEG original
images from Google Pixel to both apps to create stego images with 10% embedding rate, where
500 originals are used for training and the rest 500 are used for testing. Again, CC-JRM and FLD
ensemble classifiers were implemented for feature extraction and classification, respectively. The
result of cross-app detection is shown in Table 3.11, where the ML was trained on Passlok data
and then tested on Pixelknot data, and vice versa.
Table 3.11 Cross detection on Pixelknot and Passlok
Training Source Pixelknot Passlok
Test Source
Pixelknot 1.0% 26.3%
Passlok 50.0% 4.0%
It is obvious in Table 3.11 that training on the cover-stego pairs created by one app and test
on the other one, makes very large extra errors. After the further study on the app Passlok,
we discover that, Passlok actually adopts a more advanced algorithms than what Pixelknot uses.
This embedding algorithm is very similar to the non-shrikage F5 Fridrich et al. (2007). Therefore,
comparing to the Pixelknot, Passlok is more diffcult to be detected. Anther difference is that,
Passlok keeps the size of all input images, while Pixelknot loads a downsampling package before
the embedding step. As a result, using images created by Pixelknot to detect stego images by
Passlok is almost impossible.
The second app we find is called “PocketStego”, and it has the same input and output image
format as Steganography M does. It seems to us that “ PocketStego” also use the spatial LSB
embedding algorithms. Again, we use 1000 JPEG images from Google Pixel to generate 1000
smaller gray-scale PNG images as the input for both apps. With embedding rate fixed to 3%,
2000 cover-stego pairs are generated by these two apps. SRM and FLD ensemble classifiers are
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implemented for feature extraction and classification, respectively. The cross-app detection result
in provided in Table 3.12, where the training sample size and test sample size are fixed to 500.
Table 3.12 Cross detection on Steganography M and PocketStego.
Training Source Steganography M PocketStego
Test Source
Steganography M 0.4% 0.7%
PocketStego 30.1% 0.3%
As we can see from Table 3.12, training on images generated by PocketStego and testing on
image created by Steganography M has a very low error, while training by Steganography M and
testing on PocketStego has an error as high as 30%. By reverse engineering, we find that, even
both apps claim they use the LSB embedding method, they implement in different ways. Steganog-
raphy M adopts a random embedding strategy to hide the payload into pixels in all three spatial
layers. However PocketStego prefers to embedding the payload into the blue channel only in a
column-wise (or row-wise by settings) order. As a result, even the input and output images look
almost same for both apps, the difference on embedding algorithms makes it almost impossible to
use data created by Steganography M to detect the app PockStego.
Based on the above experiments, we conclude that, comprehending the algorithms of stego
apps is very important for detecting stego images created by apps. Therefore the concept of
“cover-source” should also include the role of stego apps in the context of detection of stego images
from stego apps.
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Kodovskỳ, J. and Fridrich, J. (2012). Steganalysis of jpeg images using rich models. In Media
Watermarking, Security, and Forensics 2012, volume 8303, page 83030A. International Society
for Optics and Photonics.
Kodovsky, J., Fridrich, J., and Holub, V. (2012). Ensemble classifiers for steganalysis of digital
media. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7(2):432–444.
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Figure 3.5 Detecting stego images created by PixelKnot, where the original images are
JPEG images collected from Google Pixel.
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Figure 3.6 Detecting stego images created by PixelKnot, where the original images are
DNG images collected from Google Pixel.
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Figure 3.7 Detecting stego images created by Steganography M, where the original images
are JPEG images collected from Google Pixel.
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Figure 3.8 Detecting stego images created by Steganography M, where the original images
are DNG images collected from Google Pixel.
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CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF EXPOSURE SETTINGS IN DIGITAL
IMAGE FORENSICS
A paper published by Proc. of IEEE Int. Conf. on Image Processing (ICIP 2018)
Li Lin, Wenhao Chen, Yangxiao Wang, Stephanie Reinders,
Yong Guan, Jennifer Newman and Min Wu
4.1 Abstract
The digital image forensics academic community is facing a growing challenge. The volume
of images presented to digital image forensic practitioners increases every day, and with it, more
variety of possible outcomes in image analysis. When an academic forensic tool is applied to a
realistic case, the effects of imaging factors, including the noise level, should be seriously considered.
Although there have been conjectures that shot noise would affect the empirical accuracy of a
forensic analyzer, it has not yet received enough experimental support. In this paper, instead
of estimating the noise, we inspect two measurable factors of exposure settings, ISO speed and
exposure time, and present a set of experiments using mobile phone data to demonstrate the effect
of exposure settings on steganalysis and PRNU-based camera device identification. Our results show
that more investigations into the characteristics of image data with respect to exposure settings is
required to fully understand identification or classification that is concerned with low-magnitude
noise measurements, such as PRNU or stego embedded messages.
4.2 Introduction
With the advent of improved camera and editing apps on smartphones, the nature and au-
thenticity of digital photos are becoming more questioned. This increasingly critical field, digital
image forensics, is important to both the academic and forensic practitioner communities. Mo-
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bile devices, in particular, allow a user to easily send a message hidden in an image acquired on
the device. Steganography changes intensity values of the image ever so slightly to represent the
bit-valued message, with no visual indication in the scene. The process of detecting steganogra-
phy using statistics, machine learning, and other means is called steganalysis. Another area of
digital image forensics is camera identification. A digital image itself contains traces of the image-
acquisition process that are represented in the observed intensity values of the photo, both from
the imaging sensor and from the in-camera processing pipeline. For example, a sensor fingerprint
such as the photo response non-uniformity (PRNU) can be extracted to identify the camera that
acquired that photo Lukas et al. (2006).
For the purpose of development and benchmarking of image forensic procedures, several image
datasets are offered by the academic community. These include BOSSbase Bas et al. (2011),
created for steganalysis, RAISE Dang-Nguyen et al. (2015), created for image forgery and the
Dresden Image Database Gloe and Böhme (2010), created for digital image forensics. Since the
birth of these databases, the standards and principles of building an image database for image
forensics have been discussed. For example, the diversity of cameras and scenes has an important
factor since the beginning Fridrich et al. (2011). Although the impact of the noise levels in images
has been shown to affect the performance of forensics Fan et al. (2013); Sedighi et al. (2016b);
Gou et al. (2007), the impact of exposure settings, such as ISO speed and exposure time, which
are highly correlated to image capture noise International Standard Organization (2006), has not
yet been studied well. Some previous work, such as Gloe et al. (2012), reveals some unexpected
phenomenon in the case study of camera identification with varied exposure times, but the work
omitted testing the ISO settings. In Bas (2016), the authors took advantage of some extreme levels
of ISO to design steganography embedding algorithms that are more secure, but it omitted the
impact on exposure settings of original image data. Another recent work Giboulot et al. (2018)
claimed that the impact of ISO settings has minor impact on steganalysis for JPEG images, but it
ignored the case for the spatial domain.
60
In this paper, we show the importance of exposure settings on two representative image foren-
sics problems, namely, digital image steganalysis and camera identification. We first perform our
experiments on the impact of ISO speed with image data from BOSSbase, and then analyze the
effects of both ISO and exposure time on steganalyzing the image data collected by iPhones. In the
case study of camera identification, we control all environmental variables to prominently reflect
the main effects of ISO speed in identifying digital camera devices. As the first study on such a
topic, our preliminary results also call attention to the roles of exposure noise levels in digital image
forensics, especially for building a benchmarking image database.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides some background information on
camera exposure settings, digital steganography and steganalysis, and camera model and device
identification. Section 3 discusses the experiments relating exposure settings to steganalysis and
camera identification. We conclude in Section 4.
4.3 Background knowledge
Settings of Exposure in Digital Cameras. A digital camera captures photons and produces
bits. ISO speed is a multiplicative gain to the voltage coming off the solid-state sensor, applied
equally to scene signal and sensor noise. The exposure time measures, in seconds, the amount of
time the aperture is open, allowing photons to be captured by the photo-sensitive material at each
pixel. The intensity value in the final image is roughly proportional to the number of photons
captured by an individual pixel, and includes effects of sensor noise and in-camera processing. In
auto-exposure mode, a digital camera is programmed to choose an ISO value and exposure time,
among other settings, which produces a digital photograph with a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
and low “image noise.” A lower ISO speed with appropriate exposure setting typically produces a
photo with lower noise and higher signal (higher SNR), and better perceptual quality to a viewer
International Standard Organization (2006). One advantage of digital cameras over film cameras
is that values for the cameras settings are saved as meta data in an EXIF file as part of the image
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data, and can be retrieved later to inspect the photo’s exposure settings. For digital image forensics
methods that depend on extracting image measures having the same order of magnitude as noise
reflecting the sensor’s ISO speed and exposure setting, we expect these measures would be impacted
by the choice of ISO and exposure setting of the image under analysis.
Digital Image Steganalysis is the analysis of image data to discover if hidden content is
contained within the image, and, if so, to uncover further information about the hidden content.
The vast majority of research has focused on identifying or classifying an image as cover (innocent)
or stego (with hidden content). We call this step steg detection. Machine learning (ML) algorithms
have proven to be the workhorse of steganalysis. Classic ML requires feature extraction, a ML
algorithm, and large amounts of data. After the HUGO competition Bas et al. (2011) in 2010, the
winners produced a new feature set and ML classifier, and these have been used as one of the top
state-of-the-art for steganography and steganalysis benchmarking. The feature set is the Spatial
Rich Model (SRM) Fridrich and Kodovsky (2012), with 34,641 features, and the classifier is the
ensemble classifier Kodovsky et al. (2012). We implement the SRM with ensemble classifier for our
ML algorithms, using code provided at Dr. Fridrich’s website.
Camera Device Identification The goal of camera model identification is to identify an image
as being acquired by one specific camera device. Typically, statistical tools are used to make the
identification. In camera identification, PRNU has been well-studied and proven to be an effective
method Lukas et al. (2006) Li (2010). PRNU is a sensor “fingerprint” that measures the differences
in photon responses between individual pixel sites on the sensor and therefore it can be used to
identify a specific device. However, the main challenge with using PRNU to represent a device is
that the PRNU image is not robust to some image processing algorithms found in popular photo
editing software, including rotation and other geometric algorithms Goljan et al. (2016).
62
ISO 100 ISO 200
ISO Setting in Test Data
0 %
5 %
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
E
rr
o
r 
R
a
te
ISO-Match Training
ISO-Mismatch Training
35.39%
20.15%
46.33%
31.50%
Figure 4.1 Error rates on different ISO data from BOSSbase.
4.4 Study of image forensics with different exposure settings
4.4.1 Steganalysis under Different Exposure Settings
4.4.1.1 Experiments on BOSSbase
To study the impact of exposure settings on steganalysis, we begin with the data from BOSS-
base, for it is the most frequently used database for benchmarking steganalysis. To reduce the
impact from differences by camera models, we use only one camera to run the experiment on im-
ages with different exposure settings. After carefully analyzing the EXIF files, we select images
taken by the PENTAX 20D in BOSSbase, as there are 603 images from this camera shot with ISO
200 and 358 images with ISO 100. To increase the sample size, we download the original raw im-
ages, convert to TIFF format by PhotoShop and then cut into five grey-scale images of dimension
512 × 512 without overlapping. This produces more than 1700 images with ISO 100 called Dataset
1, and 3000 images with ISO 200 called Dataset 2.
After constructing these two datasets, we implement the Spatial embedding algorithm “MiPOD”
Sedighi et al. (2016a) with 0.1 payload size to both datasets. The SRM and ensemble classifier have
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been applied for feature extraction and classification, respectively. For each dataset, we randomly
pick 800 images for training, and then test on 800 images chosen from the remaining images in the
same dataset. We also test on another 800 images randomly chosen from the other dataset having
the different ISO setting. The result of this experiment is provided in Fig. 4.1, and the error rate
is computed as the average error of false alarms and missed detections.
As we can see from Fig. 4.1, applying a well-trained classifier to target data with different ISO
brings significantly higher errors. For example, training on ISO 100 data and testing on ISO 100
data has error rate 20.15%, but if we apply this very classifier directly to test images with ISO 200,
an unacceptable penalty with 46.33% error rate will be the consequence for ignoring the impact of
ISO speed.
4.4.1.2 Experiments on Image Data from iPhones
Although BOSSbase contains images with a variety of ISO settings, many photos in BOSSbase
were taken with auto exposure modes or half auto exposure modes. So this database is not suitable
for studying the impact of exposure time on steganalysis. Additionally, different ISO settings with
auto exposure modes usually imply a change in scene contents or light conditions when images are
captured. To continue running experiments focusing on the main effects of exposure time, optimally
we should collect images with various exposure settings on same scene content.
We choose an app called “ProCam” for our experiments on iPhones, since this app allows
convenient selection of ISO and exposure time, and enables us to save the raw image in .dng or .tiff
formats. With “ProCam” installed on three different iPhones from three models (6S, 6SPlus and
7), student photographers were tasked to collect large amounts of images. All photographers took
a series of 10 images fixed on the same scene (all scenes were indoors at various locations), where
the first photo was taken in auto exposure mode, and the remaining nine images were taken under
specific settings with three ISO speeds: 100, 200, 1000 and three exposure times: 1/10 s, 1/50 s,
and 1/200 s.
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Figure 4.2 Misclassification rates on data with different ISO settings on iPhone 7, when
the exposure time is locked to 1/50 s
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Figure 4.4 Misclassification rates on data with different settings of exposure time on
iPhone 7, when the ISO is locked to 100
More than 1500 original tiff images were collected for each iPhone, producing 150 different scenes
with the same exposure setting. To increase the sample size, we cut the original color images into
five smaller grey images with dimension 512 × 512, as we did for BOSSbase. Therefore, for each
phone, we now have 750 images as covers for each exposure setting, with 150 different scenes.
Spatial embedding algorithm MiPOD was implemented to all cover images with 0.1 payload size.
We apply SRM for feature extraction and ensemble classifier for image classification as we did for
BOSSbase data. For each phone, we randomly select 700 images with the same exposure setting for
training and then test the trained classifier on 700 images with different exposure settings, repeating
10 times. That is, for each dataset with same exposure setting, 10-fold cross validation error was
computed as a baseline to compare the performance with different classifiers. Most images with
ISO 1000, exposure time 1/10 s are highly saturated, so we drop all results related to this setting.
We observed that the results are quite similar across all three iPhones, so we only select results
from experiments on iPhone 7 to present in Fig. 4.2 - 4.5.
In Fig. 4.2 and Fig .4.3, we fix the exposure time and compare the error rates for image datasets
that have different ISO settings. The results from these two are similar to what we have learned
66
Exposure Time 1/200 s Exposure Time 1/50 s Exposure Time 1/10 s
0 %
5 %
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
E
rr
or
 R
at
e
Training on 1/200 s
Training on 1/50 s
Training on 1/10 s
9.90%
20.52%
40.71%
25.13%
18.67% 28.18%
24.50%
19.50%
12.20%
Figure 4.5 Misclassification rates on data with different settings of exposure time on
iPhone 7, when the ISO is locked to 200
from BOSSbase, that is, training the data with one ISO setting but testing the data with another
ISO brings extra errors. In Fig. 4.4 and 4.5, the ISO settings are both fixed. By changing the
settings of exposure time, we discover that the exposure time also plays an important role as well
as ISO speed. Take the detection classifier based on data with ISO 200, exposure time 1/10 for an
example, the 12.20% error rate is low. However, if this classifier was used to test the data with the
same ISO but shorter exposure time of 1/200, then there would be a 40.71% misdetection rate as
penalty.
Based on results in Fig. 4.2 - 4.5, all previous assumptions on methods and database, we
conclude that, the lowest error rates happen when the training data and test data share the same
exposure settings. Moreover, for the same test data, training on data with a larger difference in
camera settings values bring higher error rates than relative closer settings. This observation leads
us to the next experiment.
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4.4.1.3 Discussions
According to the ISO standard International Standard Organization (2006), for every scene
content, images with higher ISO or longer exposure time have larger grey values and more noise
than images with lower ISO and shorter exposure time. Notice that scene content was fixed for
experiments on iPhones, and images in BOSSbase are collected by half-auto or auto settings. We
apply a wavelet denoiser Mihcak et al. (1999) for all images we selected in BOSSbase to get a clean
image, and then compute the noise as the mean variance for each individual image, given by
σ2 =
1
m · n
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(F (i, j)− I(i, j))2 (4.1)
where F (i, j) is the grey value at coordinate (i, j), and I(i, j) is the grey value after denoising.
The results are provided as boxplot in Fig. 4.6.
As we can see from Fig. 4.6 (a) and (b), there exists only a very slightly change in grey values
for images with different ISO settings, while noise levels increase nearly 50% on average from ISO
100 to ISO 200. Fig. 4.6 (c) shows vividly that, on average, with the change in the mean grey values
across all pixel values, noise associated with ISO 200 is higher than noise by ISO 100. Combining
results from Fig. 4.6 with Fig. 4.1, it is very natural to associate the high error rate in the
ISO-mismatch case, with the impact of noise variance. We are conducting further studies on this
topic.
4.4.2 Camera Identification under Different ISO Settings
In this subsection,we design a simple experiment as an extreme case to analyze the effects of
ISO settings in the device identification problem. Two Google Pixel phones, labeled as Pixel-1 and
Pixel-2 have been purchased. We start with two ISO settings, ISO 100 and ISO 1000, since ISO
100 is a typical setting for image outdoor images, and ISO 1000 is common for indoor images. In
addition, we select a fixed exposure time of 1/50 s such that all photos collected in the experiments
are neither too dark nor too bright. The device Pixel-1 is selected to generate its PRNU reference,
and the other device, Pixel-2 is used for testing only. To simulate a scenario when the target
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device is not accessible, we did not use flat-field images, and instead collected 50 images taken
with the exact same scene and same ISO 100 to produce the PRNU reference for Pixel-1. To
reduce the impact of natural scene content when collecting these 50 images, we developed an app
called “Cameraw” Chen (2017) for Android phones, which allows us to turn off the digital image
stabilization and lock all camera settings during the photo collection. More importantly, it takes
images with less than 0.5 seconds between each image acquisition. Fig. 4.7 provides an example of
collecting image data as described, for one fixed scene.
With “Cameraw” installed on the two Google Pixels, we implement the algorithm in Lukas
et al. (2006) to generate the PRNU reference for Google Pixel-1 and a variety of other scene data
for Pixel-1 and Pixel-2. The test database contains 200 images, 100 images from each device. For
each device, 50 images are taken with the ISO 100 and 50 images are taken with ISO 1000. We
compute the normalized correlation between the reference image and noise pattern extracted from
each test image. The correlation values are illustrated by boxplots in Fig. 4.8.
In Fig. 4.8, the lowest correlation values are between the ISO setting of 100 on different devices.
However, it is surprising that test images from another device with high ISO 1000 have even greater
correlation values, than images from the same device but taken by a different ISO setting. With
such data, any advanced classifier based on PRNU correlations would fail to identify the correct
device. This scenario could happen when the PRNU reference pattern is obtained from outdoor
images, but the images to test are all shot inside of a building.
Our experiment on Google Pixel phones suggests that ISO also plays an important role in
camera forensic analysis. Since the iOS version of Cameraw is still under development, we are not
able to test for iPhones at this stage. However, the previous results call for the image forensics
community to carry out more experimental studies and analysis in order to gain comprehensive
understandings toward what ISO setting(s) should be used to compute a reference PRNU of a
camera, and how reliable matching with a test image should be done for camera identification.
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4.5 Conclusion and Future work
The primary goal of this paper is to explore the role of exposure settings in digital image foren-
sics. The first two experiments reveal the effects of ISO speed and exposure time in steganalysis,
and the third experiment shows the importance of ISO speed in camera identification problems.
Our results show that, even for a fixed device, adapting the exposure parameters for the target
images can significantly improve the performance of a forensic analyzer. In addition, to build an
image database for benchmarking digital image forensics, the diversity of exposure settings for
images in such a database must be taken into account. We plan to study the impact of exposure
settings on other learning paradigms in future work.
4.6 Appendix I: Exposure setting on ISO speed
ISO speed or ISO, was originally developed to describe the sensitivity of silver-halide film for
still photography. There is some implicit relationship between ISO speed and image quality. In
2006, the International Standard Organization published the ISO 12232 standard, which defines an
ISO speed metric for digital cameras that is explicitly related to image quality.
To avoid the overexposure or underexposure, the auto-exposure program has three important
parameters to select, which includes the aperture value (f#), the shutter speed t, and the exposure
index (EI) (which is nominally equal to ISO speed). And for best performance, one suggest equation
is given as:
(f#)2
t
=
EI < La >
15.4
(4.2)
where < La > presents the average scene luminance. According to International Standard
Organization (2006), the exposure index EI, or ISO speed can be defined as the function of H by
the following formula:
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EI =
8
Hg
≈ 10
Ha
(4.3)
where the Hg is the geometric mean focal plane exposure and Ha is the arithmetic mean focal
plane exposure. The derivation process for 4.2 and 4.3 can be found at International Standard
Organization (2006).
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Figure 4.6 Plots of noise levels and average grey values for 2000 cover images from exper-
iments on BOSSbase.
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Figure 4.7 Experiment Design for PRNU-based device identification on image data with
different ISO speed
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Figure 4.8 Normalized correlation values for noise patterns of two Google phones, where
the PRNU reference is generated by 50 image with ISO 100 and exposure time
1/50 s from a fixed scene indoor.
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CHAPTER 5. DOMAIN ADAPTATION METHODS IN STEGANALYSIS
FOR THE SPATIAL DOMAIN
A paper published in Proc. of Conf. on Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics 2018
Li Lin, Jennifer Newman, Stephanie Reinders, Yong Guan, and Min Wu
5.1 Abstract
A scenario of domain adaptation (DA) in machine learning occurs when training and test data
are drawn from some population with different distributions. In steganalysis, this scenario can
arise when images used for training and testing come from different cameras, especially in blind
detection. Although there has been some work in this area, it is still not clear that one can design
a feasible detection scheme for all devices from one camera model. In this research, Spatial Rich
Models (SRM) and ensemble classifiers have been applied for feature extraction and classification,
respectively. After carefully collecting images from several camera models from mobile phones,
with at least two devices for each model, we identify two measurable factors that affect detection:
ISO speed and exposure time. This allows us to adapt the classifier from one device to a different
one of the same model, even when images from the two devices are significantly different in visual
appearance, by choosing specific training data. Our experiments show that a well-trained stego
detector based on data from one source shows more adaptability to new target data if the training
images have similar distributions of ISO speed and exposure time as the target images.
5.2 Motivation
Digital image steganalysis is the analysis of image data to discover if hidden content is con-
tained within the image. To classify an image as cover (no hidden content, or innocent) or stego
(with hidden content), many machine learning (ML) feature selection methods and classification
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algorithms, such as Miche et al. (2006); Fridrich and Kodovsky (2012); Denemark et al. (2014);
Kodovsky et al. (2012), have been developed. The evaluation of such ML detectors are typically
based on the empirical errors from the experiments on a given database, in which the training
samples and the test samples are assumed to have the same sources. However, the rapid develop-
ment in digital mobile devices brings new challenges to the steganalysis community. Individuals
are more likely to take pictures using their mobile phones, and there are many different kinds of
mobile phones and camera apps. Moreover, there are many stego apps that allow users to embed
secret messages into images conveniently. Creating a stego image is much easier than ten years ago.
Therefore, it is very necessary to extend stego detection experiments from several fixed cameras to
a broader range of image sources.
To explore the possibility of identifying a stego image from (practically) unlimited sources,
it is unlikely to maintain the assumption that the target device is still included in the training
database. Some previous work, such as Kodovskỳ et al. (2014), defines this as the cover-source
mismatch problem, and shows that in the worst case, no matter what adjustments are made to
the ML algorithm, no improvement is seen without including the source data. Note that the paper
Kodovskỳ et al. (2014) only discusses cases where the target camera models are not contained in the
training database. It is still not clear that with knowledge of the camera model, one can successfully
detect stego images from other cameras in this same model by training on one device from that
particular camera model. We note here that, even after limiting to one single camera model, this
problem is not trivial, since the images from the target devices are very likely to have different
properties than the images in the training database. Applying a well-trained classifier directly to
new data may bring unacceptably high errors. This is a typical domain adaptation problem, which
aims at transferring the knowledge from a source domain to a different test domain.
Numerous progress has been made in domain adaptation and transfer learning through the past
years. The formal definition of domain adaptation and its relationship to transfer learning are well
explained in Pan and Yang (2010); Ben-David et al. (2010); Weiss et al. (2016). Domain adaptation
has been widely applied in many fields, including speech recognition and face recognition Reynolds
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et al. (2000); Shekhar et al. (2013). If we introduce the terms of domain adaptation into the
context of steganalysis, then images collected by one device and labeled as “ cover ” or “ stego ” in
the training database form a sample from one source domain, and unlabeled images collected by
another, distinct device for testing is a sample from the target domain. In fact, readers will learn
from our experiments described below that, if the data collection for two such devices produces
data that are independent from each other, with regards to certain factors, that a classifier that
successfully separates covers from stegos in the source domain, may fail to classify the stego images
for the target device, even under the condition that the target camera is the same model as the
training source. Thus, a very natural question is, what kind of factors can be used to describe the
similarity between the source domain and the target domain.
Many factors, including the complexity of the scene contents, the saturation level of images, and
the noise level of images, affect the empirical error rate of detecting stego images. Some previous
work, such as Fridrich (2013); Sedighi et al. (2016b); Gou et al. (2007), has already shown that
noise levels affect the performance of an image classifier. To study if noise is also a factor which can
separate the target domain from the source, we look for measurable variables that can represent
the noise level of a image, rather than computed noise values. Since all computations of noise
values in an image have their shortcomings, we chose to focus on having an indirect measure of the
noise in an image that is part of the camera system. ISO speed and exposure time are the first
two parameters we start with, as they have strong correlation to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
images in auto-exposure mode International Standard Organization (2006).
In short, the goal of this paper is to explore domain adaptation problems in a more practical
steganalysis setting. We outline our work in the following steps: 1. Under what conditions can
domain adaptation be introduced into a more practical steganalysis framework? 2. How can we
detect stego images from many various cameras, by training with image data from limited sources?
3. How well do the factors of ISO and exposure time work in creating an adaptive classifier that
works on unseen devices from the same model? To answer the above questions, we construct our
own dataset and design a series of well-controlled experiments using our data.
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Here one particular hypothesis is explained in depth and is examined in the light of current
literature.
5.3 Preparation of experiments
The particular choice of image dataset plays a crucial role in any research field involving image
processing and machine learning. To run experiments for domain adaptation in steganalysis, image
data from various sources with rich and varied properties are very much in demand. In addition,
to analyze certain factors, we require that images are collected through a series of well-controlled
procedures. There are several image datasets utilized by the image forensics communities. These
include BOSSbase Bas et al. (2011), constructed for steganalysis; RAISE Dang-Nguyen et al. (2015),
designed for image forgery; and the Dresden Image Database Gloe and Böhme (2010), created for
digital image forensics. Unfortunately, none of above image databases is designed for the study of
domain adaptation problems. Therefore, we create a database expressly for our purposes, which
we describe next.
5.3.1 Devices
With the development of the mobile Internet, the built-in cameras in cell phones are very
commonly used to take photos on a daily basis. Mobile phones are preferred to individual digital
still cameras for many reasons, including lighter weight and readiness to capture pictures; improved
Table 5.1 Camera Specification.
Device Rear Camera MegaPixel Image Size Aperture Image Stabilization
iPhone6s-1
Sony Exmor RS IMX315 12 4032×3024 f/2.2 Digital
iPhone6s-2
iPhone6sPlus-1
Sony Exmor RS IMX315 12 4032×3024 f/2.2 Digital and Optical
iPhone6sPlus-2
iPhone7-1
2nd-generation Sony Exmor RS 12 4032×3024 f/1.8 Digital and Optical
iPhone7-2
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quality of mobile phone cameras is also leading the general public away from the use of digital still
cameras. Therefore, unlike other benchmark databases for image forensics, in which images were
collected solely by digital still cameras, we choose mobile phones as the devices for our image data
collection. The widespread use of mobile phones and the cameras associated with them not only
allows us to collect images from a variety of sources, but also gives us a great opportunity to test
the performance of stego detection algorithms on image data collected by a large number of devices.
The initial data collection for our database, called StegoAppDB, utilized six iPhones purchased
for our lab representing three different phone models: two devices of the iPhone 6s model, two
devices of the iPhone 6sPlus model, and two devices of the iPhone7 model. Table 5.1 lists some
technical specifications of the camera system for these devices. In order to run experimental tests
on different devices using the same camera model, we acquired two devices from the same model,
and label the individual devices as indicated in the first column in Table 5.1.
5.3.2 Data Collection
After iOS 10 was announced, software engineers were able to develop third-party camera apps
that allow a user to shoot photos in a manual mode and save them in raw formats. After investigat-
ing a few such apps, we chose the app “ProCam” Azzam (2017) to collect data for our experiments.
This app allows more convenient selection of ISO setting and exposure time, and enables us to save
the raw image in .dng or .tiff formats. With ProCam installed, all six lab iPhones were assigned
to different student photographers to take photos. To better control the variability of lighting
conditions, we required all images to be taken indoors. More than 20 student photographers were
recruited, with each photographer checking out a single device at a time to collect his or her indoor
photos. A photographer was required to take photos using a specific procedure. The procedure
stated that a set of 10 individual photographs were to be acquired while the camera was hand-
pointed to a specific scene of the photographer’s choice, using 10 different exposure settings: one
at the camera’s auto-exposure setting, and the remaining nine with all combinations of three ISO
speeds: 100, 200, 1000, and three exposure times: 1/10 seconds, 1/50 seconds, and 1/200 seconds.
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Figure 5.1 A set of 10 sample images.
The scene remained fixed for the 10 photos of such a set. All original images were saved in .tiff
format by the app. In Figure 5.1, we display a sample of a set of 10 images. A minimum number of
150 sets of 10 images were collected for each iPhone, resulting in at least 1500 original photographs
over the required range of exposure settings for each device.
In this manner, a total of more than 10,000 original images with the native image dimensions
(roughly 4000 × 3000 pixels) were collected, representing 1000 different indoor scenes with the six
iPhones. To increase our sample size of cover images, we extracted five subimages of dimension 512
× 512 from each original color image, and saved them as gray-scale images, as shown in Figure 5.2.
This produced a minimum of 750 images of size 512 × 512 that we designated as cover images for
each phone for each of the 10 exposure settings. Some devices had more images available, providing
an excess of 2000 cover images.
A sample size of two iPhone devices of the same model is not sufficient to discuss the performance
of a well-trained steganalysis classifier applied to other devices from the same camera model. Thus,
we performed another experiment to collect images from a large number of different devices of the
same model. Selecting the iPhone7, we recruited more than 50 iPhone7 devices from volunteers
(52 to be precise), and from each of the 52 devices, collected 40 original raw images under the 10
exposure settings, using the same procedure described above for our lab iPhones. With more than
2000 original images and 10,000 smaller cover images from 50 different iPhone7 devices, we are
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Figure 5.2 Extracting five gray-scale subimages from a color image.
able to study the performance of a steganalysis classifier trained by images from a single device
and tested on data with more than 50 different origins.
5.3.3 Creation of Stego Images
For our experiments, we implemented three embedding algorithms, using the associated code
on Dr. Jessica Fridrich’s website: “Wavelet Obtained Weights”(WOW) Holub and Fridrich (2012),
“Spatial version of the Universal Wavelet Relative Distortion”(S-UNIWARD) Holub et al. (2014),
and “Minimizing the power of the most Powerful Detector”(MiPOD)Sedighi et al. (2016a). Stego
images were generated from the cover images using these algorithms. We fix the embedding payload
rate at 0.1 bits per pixel (bpp), and leave all other parameters at the default settings, since the
goal of this paper is not concerned with the security of the embedding algorithms, but simply to
compare the relative effect of our experiments using state-of-the-art embedding algorithms.
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5.3.4 Steganalysis Method
Many machine learning algorithms have proven to be the workhorse of steganalysis. Classic
ML requires feature extraction, an ML algorithm, and large amounts of data. In the following
experiments, the Spatial Rich Model (SRM) Fridrich and Kodovsky (2012), with 34,641 features
is used as the feature set. The Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD) ensemble classifier Kodovsky
et al. (2012) is implemented for the classification of stego images. We chose this ML procedure
because this combination has been identified by the steganography community as being one of the
top-ranked ML steganalysis algorithms. The performance of classifiers is evaluated by the average
error on test data. That is, if we let PMD denote the percentage of misdetections and PFA the
percentage of false alarms, then for a dataset constituting 50% cover images and 50% stego images,
the average error rate PE for the detection is defined as
PE =
1
2
(PMD + PFA). (5.1)
5.4 Discussion of Experimental Design
A discussion of the statistics involved in our experiments is informative. The design of our
experiments was approached to produce meaningful results. We attempted to fix as many of the
variables as reasonably possible and then vary only one or two, to observe the results and how they
Table 5.2 Average Cross-Device Detection Error Rate, based on Image Data taken in
Auto-Exposure Mode using Embedding Method MiPOD.
Training: iPhone6s-1 iPhone6s-2 iPhone6sPlus-1 iPhone6sPlus-2 iPhone7-1 iPhone7-2
Target:
iPhone6s-1 14.8%(CV) 17.5% 25.3% 20.1% 37.4% 42.8%
iPhone6s-2 14.9% 13.7%(CV) 33.1% 28.0% 31.3% 41.1%
iPhone6sPlus-1 23.0% 23.2% 13.9%(CV) 12.1% 47.3% 42.7%
iPhone6sPlus-2 22.0% 23.4% 15.1% 11.6%(CV) 46.7% 42.5%
iPhone7-1 46.3% 43.1% 36.4% 31.2% 22.2%(CV) 39.3%
iPhone7-2 48.3% 41.7% 40.6% 36.9% 44.3% 21.8%(CV)
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varied when the factors were varied. Thus, for each phone, budget limitations kept our purchase to
two phones of one model. We chose to use the same camera app on all phones, and fix all settings
in the app for each photo taken, excepting the two factors of ISO and exposure time that were
varied. The operating systems of the phones and the app version were kept the same during the
initial photo collection, although they were later updated due to security reasons. Unfortunately,
the 50 phones from volunteers had a variety of different operating systems which did not match
our labs’ iPhones data. The choice of ISO and exposure settings were selected carefully to cover
as broad a range as possible, yet still produce mostly visibly identifiable photos for one scene, thus
emulating most photographs that might be taken by people (see Figure 5.1 for an example). The
number 700 for the number of images was chosen as a compromise between the number of samples
needed to produce statistically significant results (more is typically better) and the computation
time required to process each image, including feature extraction, and the associated classifiers. The
feature extraction was the most computationally expensive. Some initial experiments using several
thousands of images did produce results with lower detection error, but, with limited resources for
computation purposes, we decided ultimately to use 700 images across most of our experiments.
We decided that at least 30 volunteer phones would suffice, but more was better and ultimately we
collected from 52 iPhone7 devices.
5.5 Experiments on Auto-Exposure Images using Six Lab iPhones
We start our first experiments on image data collected in auto-exposure mode for the six lab
iPhone devices. For each device, the original auto-exposure photos consist of more than 150 different
scenes. For each embedding method, cropping each original photo into 5 smaller gray images
generates 750 cover-stego pairs as the sample size (for the distribution of images) for each device.
SRM and ensemble classifiers are applied for feature extraction and classification, respectively. For
each device, 700 cover-stego pairs are randomly selected first, and are used to generate a stego
classifier for that particular device. Before applying a classier generated by images from one device
to the other five image datasets with different sources, we record the ten-fold cross-validation (CV)
84
error of classifying the stego images from the same device, and view it as a baseline of detecting
stego images from the target device. The result of cross-device testing on the embedding algorithm
MiPOD is provided in Table 5.2. We omit the error table of cross-device experiment for embedding
algorithms WOW and S-UNIWARD, since they have almost the same trend as presented in Table
5.2.
As we can see from Table 5.2, for every targeted dataset in the experiment, the lowest error
occurs when the training images are drawn from the same phone models as used for the test data.
This is not a surprise, as mentioned earlier, some previous work on the cover-source model mismatch
problem reveals that if the target data are collected by camera models that are not included in the
training database, a high error rate occurs Kodovskỳ et al. (2014). The relatively low error rates
of 20%-30% in the cross-camera-model experiments on iPhone6s and iPhone6sPlus (Table 5.2) is
consistent with the fact that the rear cameras on the iPhone6s and the iPhone6sPlus are similar
(Table 5.1).
If we focus on the case when the training data and testing data are from the same camera models,
the results are even more interesting. As Table 5.2 shows, applying a well-trained classifier based on
data from one iPhone6s to the image data collected by the other iPhone6s, produces an error rate
almost as low as the respective CV errors, and a similar case holds for the iPhone6sPlus phones.
However, this is not the case for iPhone7 devices, where the cross-device errors are significantly
higher than the CV error. Considering the good quality control of iPhones, we are more inclined
to believe that there are some other factors related to the image noise that affects the results of
the cross-testing.
The connection between the noise and the exposure settings is a well-known phenomenon in
photography (see, for example, London et al. (2017)). Thus, we analyze the meta data of our
original images (which, although can be easily changed, we know are authenticated as we took the
photos), and then display our discovery in Figure 5.3, in which the two-variable histogram of ISO
speed and exposure time is plotted as a 3D graph for every phone model. In Figure 5.3, image data
from the two iPhone6s’ share most of the settings of ISO speed and exposure time with each other,
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and a similar case holds for the plot for the two iPhone6sPlus’. However, in the case of the iPhone7
devices, the settings of auto-exposure images from iPhone7-1 and iPhone7-2 barely intercept. Since
the auto-exposure program usually adjusts setting parameters based on the lighting condition, it is
fair to view the images collected by the device iPhone7-1 as having properties quite a bit different
from the images taken by the device iPhone7-2. One possible explanation is that the student
photographers for iPhone7-1 have very different hobbies in scene contents or light conditions than
the student photographers for iPhone7-2. That is the reason why we need to introduce the domain
adaption method in steganalysis, and even when we limit the source of data to a single camera
model, such as iPhone7, a well-trained classifier is not always adaptive.
5.6 A Domain Adaptation Solution to the Cross-Device-Test Problem
In the previous experiment, a well-trained classifier based on data from one iPhone7 fails to
classify the target data collected by the other iPhone7. In the language of domain adaptation,
that implies the image data from these two iPhone7 devices are from two separate domains (of
distribution). Figure 5.3 provides two parameters that separate these two image sets. One natural
idea is to view these two parameters, ISO speed and exposure time, as factors that may represent
the distribution domain of image data. So, our second experiment is to redo the cross-device
experiment on images that have the same ISO speed and exposure time.
To that end, we first partition the images from all six iPhones into nine subsets such that all
images in the same set have the same ISO speed and exposure time. Then for each subset and the
same embedding method, we randomly select 700 cover-stego pairs of images taken by iPhone7-1,
build a stego-detection classifier, and then test it on (a different set of) 700 pairs of images from
iPhone7-2. After performing this random experiment twenty times, the errors for MiPOD at 10%
embedding rate are plotted in Figure 5.4, in which the CV errors (red stars) are plotted as the
baseline against which to evaluate the performance of our adaptive classifiers that are plotted as
boxplots. Table 5.3 shows the labels identifying the nine different exposure settings, which we use
to efficiently label the x-axis for Figure 5.4. The boxplots for the other two embedding algorithms
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can be found in Figure 5.8. We use the term adaptive classifier here to mean that the classifier is
trained on one set of data and tested on a set of data from a different device or model of phone.
In Figure 5.4, when we fix the ISO speed and exposure times, even the highest error rate
generated by the adaptive classifier tested on the iPhone7-2 data is still below 25% on average.
Note also that the boxplots of the errors made by the adaptive classifiers follow the same trend as
the CV errors across all nine exposure settings. Moreover, for each setting, if we compare the value
of the CV error from the iPhone7-1 data to the range of the boxplots of errors made by the adaptive
classification, we discover that the adaptive classifiers work almost as well as the ML classifier this
time, as compared to the data in Table 5.2. We omit the case when the roles of the training source
and test source are exchanged between our two iPhone7 devices, since the result is quite similar.
To give further experimental support to the results we see with our iPhone7 devices, we run the
same experiments on the pairs of iPhone6s and iPhone6sPlus models. These results are provided
in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. We remark that for those interested in the relation between image
noise and classification accuracy, the red stars representing the CV errors in Figure 5.9 and Figure
5.10 are also worth further study, but is not included in this paper.
Training an adaptive classifier on data from one camera device and one set of exposure settings,
then testing on data from a different device but the same camera model and same exposure settings,
can be viewed as a very restricted experiment, since it can be argued that this scenario does not
emulate practical situations, or even that these experiments are not interesting and have obvious
results. However, we contend that investigations of this sort are necessary to explore the effect
of specific data that is used for training and testing steganalysis classifiers, which, in time, may
lead to better understanding of the entire steganography embedding and detecting process. Access
Table 5.3 Table 3. Labels of 9 Sets of Different Exposure Settings.
ISO, Exposure Time: 100, 1/200 s 100, 1/50 s 100, 1/10 s 200, 1/200 s 200, 1/50 s 200, 1/10 s 1000, 1/200 s 1000, 1/50 s 1000, 1/10 s
Label: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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to creating this data allowed us to pursue these experiments, whose results are not necessarily so
predictable.
Since meta or EXIF information is easily manipulated, and is not a reliable source of model
information for a digital image, we have the problem of the unknown domain for an unknown image.
In the context of domain adaptation, one method to solve this problem for the unknown domain is
to develop a combination of weighted classifiers based on the current knowledge. We refer readers
to the paper Ben-David et al. (2010), for more rigorous details. Another way to solve this problem
is to draw the training data from a large number of different sources such that the test domain is
included in the training domain.
For the last problem, the auto-exposure images taken by our two iPhone7 devices make a very
good target source to try our idea, although with only two phones. To view the distribution of
ISO and exposure time more clearly, we provide a scatter plot of these two variables in Figure
5.5. As we can see from Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.3, the auto-exposure images collected by iPhone7
devices have most of their ISO speed values less than 200, and their exposure times vary from 1/35
second to 1/5 second. Comparing them to the range of the fixed exposure settings in Table 5.3,
we predict that we might see a fair performance of an adaptive classifier built by training from
combinations of images from these nine subsets and then testing on the auto-exposure image data.
We speculate this because the range of (ISO, exposure time) pairs for the auto-exposure images
falls within the range of the (ISO, exposure time) pairs for the training data. Thus, we randomly
select 700 pairs of images from the union of the nine subsets of fixed-exposure settings from one
iPhone7, build a stego classifier for embedding algorithm MiPOD as before, and then test it on the
auto-exposure images from the other iPhone7. This time the CV error is generated by training on
the auto-exposure images for each target device. The result is presented in Figure 5.6. The CV
error in Figure 5.6 is indicated by the yellow bars (and is also given in Table 5.2). In Figure 5.6, the
new adaptive classifiers trained by images with nine different exposure parameters have fairly low
error rate when detecting the stego images from the other source, and are comparable to the CV
error. Noticing the fact that only nine exposure settings in the (ISO, 1/exposure time) plane have
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been used to develop this classifier, we predict that an even better adaptive steganalysis classifier
can be built by adding more training data from additional and different (ISO, exposure time) pairs,
which is part of our future work.
5.7 Experiments on Image Data with Rich Origins
All results and conclusions in previous sections involve only two devices from the same camera
model. In this section, we select one camera model, which is the rear camera in iPhone7, and
recruit as many iPhone7 devices as possible from volunteers during a time period of several months
to conduct our next experiments. The data collection is described above, in which a total number
of 2000 original photos and 10,000 cover images from 52 different iPhone7 devices are collected and
processed. After cleaning the data, we chose the images from one of our lab devices, the iPhone7-
1, to generate nine adaptive classifiers based on a random sample of 700 cover-stego pairs of its
images for each of the nine different exposure settings, and then test each adaptive classifier on
700 pairs of images from the 52 devices. The first target subset of images is a random sample of
700 pairs of auto-exposure images from the 52 iPhone7 devices. By training on 700 labeled pairs
from iPhone7-1 with nine different settings, we build the classifier based on the data from just one
source. The result is present in Table 5.4. Although there is a gap between the first two error rates
in Table 5.4, we still believe that the performance is fair enough, especially considering that the
test data are from 52 different devices and only nine exposure settings of training data have been
involved in the experiment.
Table 5.4 Experimental Results of Detecting MiPOD on Auto-Exposure Images from 52
iPhone7’s (sample size =700)
Training Source Test Error
Auto-Exposure Images from 52 iPhone7 devices 26.0% (CV)
Images with 9 exposure settings from iPhone7-1 32%
Auto-Exposure Images from iPhone7-1 41%
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Another explanation for the gap between the CV error and the prediction error is that the
data collected for both our lab devices iPhone7-1 and iPhone7-2 was completed 10 months before
the images were collected for the 52 iPhone7 devices, and therefore the iOS versions are different,
which may cause some changes in the camera APIs. In addition, the training data from iPhone7-1
are images taken from more than 200 scenes in different buildings, but the images taken by the 52
iPhone7 devices are collected in two different rooms with relatively fixed scenes.
We also tested the performance of the adaptive classifiers for each fixed (ISO, exposure time)
combination in the dataset for the 52 sources. We trained nine distinct classifiers using 700 pairs of
image data from the iPhone7-1 device, and tested each classifier on corresponding (ISO, exposure
time) data from the 52 iPhone7 devices. We also tested an additional 700 pairs of iPhone7-1 image
data, and plot this next to the error rate for the 52 iPhone7 devices. The results are summarized
as bar plots of the average error rates for 52 iPhone7 devices in Figure 5.7. In Figure 5.7, it is
quite obvious that the average error rates for 52 iPhone7 devices are noticeably higher than the
errors testing on iPhone7-1 data itself. But we have to point out that the test errors on iPhone7-1
data are not the CV errors for the target (52 phones) datasets. We computed the CV errors for
the 52 phones, and found they are very small due to the way we collected those images. Therefore,
considering the fact that greatest error for the (ISO, exposure time) setting of (1000, 1/200) is
around 30% for detecting MiPOD with 10% spatial embedding for 52 targeted devices, one can not
deny that our proposed adaptive method has a decent performance. However, by analyzing the
meta data of the 52 iPhone7 devices, we noticed that the iOS versions for all phone are not identical.
This may also play an important role in contributing to the errors, and to show a complete result
with a fair sample size, we leave this topic to a future experiment.
5.8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, the experiments on auto-exposure images from a pair of iPhone7 motivated us
to explore domain adaptation to steganalysis. Two main exposure parameters, ISO speed and
exposure time, which are well known for their relationship to the noise of images, have been taken
90
into account as factors for building adaptive classifiers. Our experimental results include a test
using 50 iPhone7 devices, and show that a well-trained stego detector, trained using data from
one device, has the ability to classify fairly competently on unseen target data from the same
model (but different devices) if the training images exhibit similar distributions of ISO speed and
exposure time as the target images. One way to view the domain adaptation process here is that
by changing the sampling procedure of the data, that is, changing which population the data was
sampled from and consequently used to train the ML algorithm, a classifier is produced that is
more representative of the population of data that will be tested on.
We remark that all results we show here are limited to the case when the training device and
target device are from the same camera model. For a target device whose model is different from
the training camera model, our preliminary experiments show the performance of the adaptive
classifiers can be very terrible in some special cases, even when the target images share the exact
same ISO and exposure time parameters as the training images. Considering the fact that the
camera model identification problem is still at the heart of research in image forensics and camera
model identification could be used as a first step in a steganography detection procedure using our
approach, the assumption of having some knowledge of the target device is not very strong. One
direction of our future work is to apply the knowledge of camera models to build a suitable stego
image classifier for the target data mixed with unknown camera models.
We implement only three spatial domain embedding algorithms and apply the classical SRM
for feature extraction. Thus, another future work is to study the domain adaptation problem for
other steganography methods, especially for those embedding algorithms working in the frequency
domain.
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Figure 5.3 2D Histogram of ISO and exposure time for original photos taken in auto-ex-
posure mode.
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Figure 5.4 Boxplots of the error rates of the adaptive classifiers tested on iPhone7-2 data
v.s. the CV errors of ML classifiers on iPhone7-2 (red stars), where adaptive
classifiers are trained by image data from iPhone7-1 (MiPOD).
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Figure 5.5 Scatter plot of exposure time v.s. ISO, for images collected at auto-exposure
settings by iPhone7-1 and iPhone7-2.
Auto-exposre images from iPhone7-1 Auto-exposure images from iPhone7-2
Target Data
0 %
5 %
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
E
rr
o
r 
R
a
te
 f
o
r 
d
e
te
c
ti
n
g
 M
iP
O
D
Training by the same dataset
Training by the auto-exposure images from the other device
Training by the images from the other device with 9 specific exposure settings
22.2%
39.3%
21.7%
44.3%
21.5%
21.7%
Figure 5.6 Performance of the adaptive classifiers, trained on three different datasets, and
tested on auto-exposure images from the two iPhone7 devices.
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Figure 5.7 Performance of the steganalysis classifiers trained on 700 pairs of images from
iPhone7-1, and tested on images taken by 52 iPhone7 devices.
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5.9 Appendix I: Supplemental Plots of Results
Figure 5.8 Boxplots of the error rates of the adaptive classifiers tested on iPhone7-2 data
v.s. the CV errors of ML classifiers on iPhone7-2 (red stars), where the adaptive
classifiers are trained by image data from iPhone7-1 (Mipod,S-Uniward and
WOW).
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Figure 5.9 Boxplots of the error rates of the adaptive classifiers tested on iPhone6s-2 v.s.
the CV errors of ML classifiers on iPhone6s-2 (red stars), for three embed-
ding algorithms, where the adaptive classifiers are trained by image data from
iPhone6s-1 (MiPOD, S-Uniward and WOW).
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Figure 5.10 Boxplots of the error rates of the adaptive classifiers tested on iPhone6sPlus-1
v.s. CV errors made by ML classifiers on iPhone6sPlus-1 (red stars), for three
embedding methods, where the adaptive classifiers are trained by image data
from iPhone6sPlus-2 (MiPOD, S-Uniward and WOW).
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5.10 Appendix II: Experiments with other Classification Algorithms
In previous experiments, we run with the SRM feature design and the Fisher Linear Discriminant
ensemble classifier to compare the results and obtain the conclusion. But there are many other
feature extraction methods and classification algorithms that haven’t been test. Since the birth of
SRM, people have been working on the dimensional reduction of the original SRM feature design,
but the progress is not significant. On the other hand, the FLD ensemble classifier is specially
designed for steganalysis, and there are some other popular classification methods such as gradient
boosting (or XGboosting) and support vector machine (SVM), have been widely applied to classify
stego images. In this section, we will mainly talk about domain spatial problems for spatial domain
stegoanalysis with polynomial kernels in SVM.
The original SVM algorithm was developed by Vapnik and Chervonenkis in 1963. In 1992,
Boser, Guyon and Vapnik suggested a way to create nonlinear classifiers by applying the kernel
trick to maximum-margin hyper planes. For more details, see Boser et al. (1992). In our case, the
polynomial kernel functions are designed as
k(xi,xj) = (γx
T
i xj + r)
M
for any data input xi,xj ∈X , where X is the SRM feature space with 34671 dimensions, and γ,
r > 0, and M ∈ Z are parameters to be tuned. In this experiment, parameters for SVM classifiers
are tuned in the range as listed in Table 5.5, and the best results of two iPhone7’s are provided
in Table 5.6. Table 5.6 shows a compilation of the classification results using various training and
testing dataset. From the first 2 row and column, we can see that by using only auto exposure
time images in training, the stego detection performance only performs well if the testing dataset
is from the same phone. When testing with another dataset from another phone, the error rate
almost doubles immediately. This basically shows that even if the images are coming from the
same phone model and are both having auto exposure setting, a well-trained classifier is not always
adaptive. Now, we shift our attention to the iPhone7- 1 and iPhone7-2 columns and rows. Notice
that for both same-device and cross-device classification, the error rates are both below 20%. There
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is an obvious increase in performance when comparing with the cross-device classification with auto
exposure settings. Comparing with the auto exposure setting, the same-device stego detection in
specific setting, had about 2% , 8% error rate reduction, while the cross-device stego detection
have the error rate reduce by more than half! Now, using these classifier trained using features of
the specific settings, again, we tested them on the dataset of auto exposure. In the first row of
Table 5.6, the classifier trained on features from specific setting of iPhone7-1, are not performing
as well on the testing data of the same phone on auto exposure setting. One possible reason is as
we mentioned before, due to great difference in ISO and exposure time between auto exposure and
specific setting values, there are a huge portion of the distribution in the two parameters that was
not covered in the classifier training.
Table 5.5 Parameter Turing for SVM
Parameter Range
Penalty parameter: C 1∼10
Kernel coefficient: γ 1∼10
Degree of polynomial kernel function: M 3∼10
Coefficient in kernel function: r 0∼10
Table 5.6 Cross-device Detection Errors, based on data taken in auto mode and nine
specific settings for MiPOD embedding.
Training: iPhone7-2(auto) iPhone7-2(auto) iPhone7-1(specific) iPhone7-2(specific)
Testing:
iPhone7-1(auto) 25.42% 40.54% 46.67% 44.63%
Phone7-2 (auto) 41.75% 21.82% 27.15% 28.18%
Phone7-1(specific) 31.78% 34.60% 17.09% 18.36%
Phone7-2(specific) 34.32% 34.75% 18.64 % 18.93%
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CHAPTER 6. ALGORITHM MISMATCH IN SPATIAL STEGANALYSIS
A paper published in Proc. of Conf. on Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics 2019
Stephanie Reinders, Li, Lin, Yong Guan, Min Wu, and Jennifer Newman,
6.1 Abstract
The number and availability of steganography embedding algorithms continues to grow. Many
traditional blind steganalysis frameworks require training examples from every embedding algo-
rithm, but collecting, storing and processing representative examples of each algorithm can quickly
become untenable. Our motivation for this paper is to create a straight-forward, non-data-intensive
framework for blind steganalysis that only requires examples of cover images and a single embedding
algorithm for training. Our blind steganalysis framework addresses the case of algorithm mismatch,
where a classifier is trained on one algorithm and tested on another, with four spatial embedding
algorithms: LSB matching, MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW.
We use RAW image data from the BOSSbase database and and data collected from six iPhone
devices. Ensemble Classifiers with Spatial Rich Model features are trained on a single embedding
algorithm and tested on each of the four algorithms. Classifiers trained on MiPOD, S-UNIWARD
and WOW data achieve decent error rates when testing on all four algorithms. Most notably, an
Ensemble Classifier with an adjusted decision threshold trained on LSB matching data achieves
decent detection results on MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW data.
6.2 Introduction
Steganography is the practice of hiding a message, called a payload, in an innocent looking
object, called a cover. The goal of steganography is to hide the payload in such a way that a casual
observer will be unaware a secret message is being sent. Digital image steganography hides payloads
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of text, images, or other data in digital images. Image steganalysis is the analysis of an image for
steganography content, and is typically accomplished with machine learning or signature-based
detection.
In targeted steganalysis the steganalyst assumes knowledge of the particular embedding algo-
rithm used. In contrast, blind steganalysis or blind detection assumes no, or little, knowledge of
the embedding algorithm. “The goal of blind steganalysis is to detect any steganographic method
irrespective of its embedding mechanism.” Pevný and Fridrich (2008b) The case of algorithm mis-
match, where a classifier is used to detect embedding algorithms not used in training, is crucial to
performing blind detection in the real world because a steganalyst is unlikely to know which em-
bedding algorithm was used. The blind detection framework that we present in this paper focuses
on algorithm mismatch.
Kong, Feng, Li and Guo address the algorithm mismatch problem on JPEG image data through
domain adaptation techniques Kong et al. (2016). They show that using their iterative, non-linear
feature transformation a classifier trained on covers and a single embedding algorithm achieves
decent detection rates on unseen embedding algorithms.
Pevný and Fridrich construct several classifiers capable of blind detection by showing the clas-
sifiers examples of as many algorithms as possible Pevný and Fridrich (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a).
However, as the number of stego algorithms increases, the steganalyst will find it increasingly
challenging to collect, store, and process examples of every possible algorithm.
We address the algorithm mismatch problem in the spatial domain with four embedding algo-
rithms: LSB matching, MiPOD Sedighi et al. (2016a), S-UNIWARD Holub et al. (2014) and WOW
Holub and Fridrich (2012). We devise a blind classification framework, consisting of a single binary
classifier, that does not require feature transformation and only requires training examples from
covers and a single embedding algorithm. We perform algorithm mismatch experiments where we
train an Ensemble Classifier Kodovský et al. (2012) with Spatial Rich Model Fridrich and Kodovský
(2012) features on one of the four embedding algorithms and test on all four algorithms. Our results
show that MiPOD, S-UNIWARD, and WOW trained classifiers achieve decent detection rates when
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testing all four embedding algorithms. Furthermore, an LSB matching trained Ensemble Classifier
with an adjusted decision threshold is able to achieve decent detection rates when testing MiPOD,
S-UNIWARD and WOW image data.
The Prior Art section contains a more in-depth summary of previous work in the area of blind
detection. We describe the datasets used and the structure of our algorithm mismatch experiments
in the Methods section. The Results section details the results of our experiments. We summarize
our findings and explain potential avenues for future research in the Conclusions and Future Work
section.
6.3 Prior Art
In this section we summarize the multi-classifier, one-class classifier, one-against-all classifier,
and domain adaptation approaches to blind detection and explain how our approach differs from
them.
The term blind steganalysis or blind detection is used in two related but different ways in
the literature. In some cases, the term is used to refer to steganalysis frameworks that aren’t
constructed for a specific embedding algorithm. As an example, the quantitative steganalyzer
introduced by Pevný, Fridrich and Ker Pevný et al. (2012) is a blind framework in the sense that it
isn’t built for any specific algorithm. Many feature sets are not specialized to a specific embedding
algorithm, but are suitable for many algorithms. Steganalysis frameworks that use such feature
sets are occasionally referred to as blind steganalysis frameworks in the literature Holotyak et al.
(2005); Goljan et al. (2006). The term blind steganalysis is also used to refer to the act of detecting
stego images when the embedding algorithm is unknown. We use this meaning of the term in this
paper.
The blind steganalysis framework we present in this paper addresses a specific blind steganal-
ysis problem, the algorithm mismatch problem, where classification is done on unseen embedding
algorithms. For the remainder of this section, we focus on prior art that addresses the algorithm
mismatch problem.
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One approach to blind detection trains a group of binary classifiers, called a multi-classifier,
on a wide variety of embedding algorithms Pevný and Fridrich (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a). More
specifically, a binary classifier is trained for each possible pair of n classes, and the multi-classifier
is the collection of these
(
n
2
)
binary classifiers. The multi-classifier assigns a test image to one of n
classes by asking each binary classifier to vote on the class of the test image. The class with the
most votes is chosen as the winner. Cover is one class and each stego embedding algorithm is its own
class. While, Pevný and Fridrich show that their multi-classifier achieves good detection results,
even on an unseen algorithm, this approach is data-intensive as it requires training examples of
n− 1 stego algorithms. Our approach differs in that it only needs training examples from a single
algorithm.
Another approach uses a one-against-all classifier, a single binary classifier trained on cover
images and a wide variety of stego algorithms Pevný and Fridrich (2008b). The one-against-
all classifier and the multi-classifier both operate on the theory that if the classifier is shown a
sufficient sample of stego algorithms to effectively represent the stego space, the classifier will be
able to detect unseen stego algorithms. A third approach trains a one-class classifier only on cover
images and uses anomaly detection to identify stego images Pevný and Fridrich (2008b). This
approach attempts to sufficiently represent the cover space in such a manner that the classifier
can recognize stegos of any algorithm as not belonging to the cover space. Pevný and and Fridrich
found that the one-against-all classifier could perform poorly on unseen algorithms and the one-class
classifier had lower overall accuracy compared with the multi-classifier. Unlike the one-against-all
classifier that is trained on many stego algorithms and the one-class classifier that isn’t trained on
any stego algorithms, our proposed classifier is trained on covers and a single stego algorithm.
Unsupervised learning has been used in several works for blind detection Ker and Pevný (2011);
Wu et al. (2016) and don’t require training or knowledge of the embedding algorithm.
Kong, Feng, Li and Guo apply domain adaptation to the algorithm mismatch problem on JPEG
image data Kong et al. (2016). Algorithm-mismatch, cover-source mismatch, or other factors could
cause the training features in the source domain and the test features in the target domain to
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have different distributions. If a classifier is trained on features with one distribution, it might
not perform well on test features of a different distribution. Kong, Feng, Li and Guo address the
sitution where the steganalyst has access to examples of labeled covers and stegos in the source
domain and unlabeled covers and stegos in the target domain. They apply a feature transformation
as a two-step process to make the features of the training set similar to the features of the test
set in the target domain. First, the features of the source domain are transformed so that the
joint expectations and the standard deviations of the source domain and the target domain are
the same. Then as a second step, the source domain features are further transformed to minimize
the maximum mean discrepancy between the marginal and conditional distributions. They show
the success of their method by applying the feature transformation to a test set of covers and
stegos from a single embedding algorithm, then training a classifier on the transformed features,
and testing the classifier on covers and stegos from a different embedding algorithm. They compare
the classification results with a classifier trained on covers and a single embedding algorithm and
tested on covers and that same embedding algorithm. While Kong, Feng, Li and Guo focus on the
DCT domain, we address the algorithm mismatch problem in the spatial domain. Our approach
does not require feature transformation: We are able to achieve decent detection results without
changing the source domain or target domain distributions.
6.4 Methods
In this section we explain the datasets and methodology used in our experiments.
6.4.1 Image Datasets
We choose to use two datasets: the BOSSbase database Bas et al. (2011) and iPhone image
data that was collected as part of a forensic database project Center for Statistics and Applications
in Forensic Evidence (2018). We choose the former because it is a well-known and benchmarked
dataset of images from digital still cameras. The latter we choose because it consists of images
from mobile devices. As increasingly more images “in-the-wild” originate from cell phone cameras,
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it is it is important to collect data from these sources Chen et al. (2018), Lin et al. (2018a),
and Lin et al. (2018b). While the iPhone dataset used in this work is not in the query part of
the StegoAppDB database, the iphone dataset is available for download after March 1, 2019, by
visiting the StegoAppDB homepage Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence
(2018) and clicking on the link for “Algorithm Mismatch Dataset.”
The BOSSbase dataset contains 10,000 RAW images from seven digital still cameras. We
convert the RAW images to TIFF images in Photoshop. Then we center-crop 512x512 subimages,
convert them to 256-bit grayscale and save them in the PNG format, all in Matlab. These 512x512
grayscale images serve as cover images. The BOSSbase images are a mixture of auto-exposure and
manual exposure images.
We use 1,927 TIFF auto-exposure images collected on two iPhone 6s, two iPhone 6s Plus, and
two iPhone 7 devices using a camera app. We convert each TIFF image to 256-bit grayscale, crop it
into five 512x512 disjoint subimages, and save in the PNG file format, totaling 9,635 cover images.
We create stego images from both datasets in the same manner. From each cover image we
create stego images using four embedding algorithms, LSB matching, MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and
WOW, and three embedding rates, 10%, 20%, and 40%, for the BOSSbase dataset. Due to time
constraints we use one embedding rate, 10%, for the iPhone dataset.
6.4.2 Methodology of Algorithm Mismatch Experiments
In an algorithm mismatch experiment we train an Ensemble Classifier Kodovský et al. (2012)
with Spatial Rich Model features Fridrich and Kodovský (2012) on covers and a single embedding
algorithm - LSB matching, MiPOD, S-UNIWARD, or WOW - and embedding rate. We choose
this classifier and feature set because they are both well-known and widely used in the steganalysis
community. We test the trained classifier on covers and all four embedding algorithms with the
same embedding rate. The detection error from the algorithm mismatch case, where the training
and testing algorithms are different, is compared to the the detection error from the best-case
classifier, where the training and testing algorithms are the same.
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We perform algorithm mismatch experiments on the full set of 10,000 images from all seven
BOSSbase devices and the full set of 9,635 auto-exposure images from six iPhone devices. We
randomly select a training set of 5,000 cover images and corresponding stego images from a single
embedding algorithm and embedding rate. The test set is comprised of the remaining cover images
and corresponding stegos from the same embedding rate used in training and all four embedding
algorithms. The results are averaged over five repetitions.
Previous work has shown that detection accuracy can be improved by training and testing on a
single device Lin et al. (2018b), so we also perform algorithm mismatch experiments on individual
devices to determine if algorithm mismatch experiments see similar improvement. Because we have
a smaller number of available images from any single device, for individual device experiments
we perform five repetitions of ten-fold cross-validation on randomly selected samples of 700 cover
images and corresponding stego images from a single embedding algorithm and embedding rate. For
each fold during the cross-validation process, 70 cover images and the corresponding stegos from all
four algorithms are set aside for testing. The training set consists of 630 covers and corresponding
stegos from a single embedding algorithm. The 630 stegos from each of the other three algorithms
are neither used for training nor testing.
We calculate the detection error rate in Equation 6.1 as the average of the false alarm rate PFA
and the missed detection rate PMD for a single algorithm. For example, for the classifier trained
on covers and MiPOD, the LSB detection error rate is the average of the false alarm rate and the
rate of LSB stegos classified as cover.
PE = min
PFA
1
2
(PFA + PMD) (6.1)
In our initial experiments we trained Ensemble Classifiers on LSB matching, MiPOD, S-
UNIWARD, and WOW image data, training one classifier for each algorithm. Each trained classifier
was used to test each of the four algorithms. The detection errors of these four classifiers for de-
tecting MiPOD using BOSSbase 40% embedding rate image data are shown in Figure 6.1. We see
that the S-UNIWARD and WOW classifiers achieve detection errors close to the best-case classifier,
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Figure 6.1 Average error rate by classifier on MiPOD test set at 40% embedding on images
from all BOSSbase devices (training size=5,000)
the MiPOD classifier. However, the LSB trained classifier results in error rates close to random
guessing when testing MiPOD images. The same experiment on different embedding rates, as well
as on the iPhone dataset produced similar results.
LSB matching is the simplest and least complex of the four embedding algorithms. This moti-
vates us to try to improve the LSB trained classifier to achieve better detection error on MiPOD,
S-UNIWARD, and WOW. With such an improvement, a steganalyst could quickly produce and
use LSB data for training classifiers, and not need to produce any other stego images for training.
We discovered that adjusting the value of the decision threshold within the Ensemble Classifier
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Figure 6.2 Average error rate by classifier on MiPOD test set at 40% embedding on images
from all BOSSbase devices (training size=5,000)
achieves this goal. We call an Ensemble Classifier with an adjusted decision threshold trained on
LSB matching data an LSB Adjusted classifier. Figure 6.2 shows that the LSB Adjusted classifier
achieves much lower detection error than the LSB classifier. We discuss the LSB Adjusted classifier
in greater detail in the next subsection.
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6.4.3 Adjusting the Decision Threshold to Improve Classification Results
We found that with slight modifications an Ensemble Classifier can be trained solely on cov-
ers and LSB matching data and achieve a decent detection error rate when testing MiPOD, S-
UNIWARD, and WOW data.
In order to explain our modifications to the Ensemble Classifier, we first give a brief overview
of the classifier’s pertinent parts. For a more in depth description see Kodovský et al. (2012). The
standard Ensemble Classifier is implemented as a collection of Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD)
base learners.
To understand the FLD, suppose we have a training set of cover-stego pairs and suppose we can
accurately classify the training set using only two features. This setup is highly improbable, but
working in 2-dimensions will allow us to graph our features. The features (x, y) of each training
image are plotted in Figure 6.3. The vector w is calculated to point in the direction that maxi-
mizes the between-class variance and minimizes the within-class variance. The decision hyperplane
(dashed line) is orthogonal to w. The classifier predicts whether a test image x is cover or stego by
projecting its features onto w:
g(x) = wTx. (6.2)
The projection value g(x) is then compared to the decision threshold b:

g(x) > b, x is cover
g(x) < b, x is stego
g(x) = b, class randomly assigned to x.
(6.3)
The standard decision threshold is chosen to minimize the detection error in equation 6.1 on the
training data, but it can be changed. In fact, we will change the location of the decision threshold
to improve the detection error of LSB trained classifiers on MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW.
Each FLD base learner in the Ensemble Classifier is constructed as described above except on
a larger training set and feature space. Cover-stego pairs are randomly selected, with replacement,
to be used for training. A subset of features from these cover-stego pairs is randomly selected,
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Figure 6.3 Example of the FLD normal vector w and decision hyperplane (dashed line)
on a feature set with 2 dimensions, x and y
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without replacement. A test image is voted on by each base learner in the classifier and the class
with the majority of votes wins.
In order to improve the detection error of LSB trained classifiers, we adjust the standard decision
threshold b for each individual base learner as follows:
badj = b− λc (6.4)
where λ is a tuning parameter and c is the standard deviation of the FLD projections of the
training images.
We found the tuning parameter λ = 0.75 to produce decent classification results for experiments
on iPhone data. In future research we plan to develop a definition of the optimal λ for a given
dataset, as well as a systematic method for determining it. We believe it is likely that the optimal
λ would be dependent on the dataset.
Figure 6.4 shows the projections of test images when tested by LSB matching trained Ensemble
Classifiers over five repetitions of ten-fold cross-validation with sample size 700. The figure does not
show outliers, which account for roughly 12% of the projections for each image type. The median
standard decision threshold is a solid red line and the median adjusted decision threshold is a red
dashed line. In general, the projections of the cover images are the smallest, the projections of the
LSB matching images are the largest and the, projections of MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW fall
in the middle. The median standard threshold successfully separates the cover images and LSB
matching images, but mistakenly classifies the MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW images as cover.
However, the median adjusted threshold is able to recognize many of the MiPOD, S-UNIWARD,
and WOW images as stego. Moreover, the adjusted decision threshold shown in figure 6.4 has
the same relationship to the projections of all five image types as the median standard decision
threshold of MiPOD trained classifiers shown in 6.5. This gives credence to the notion that an LSB
matching trained classifier can achieve detection error rates when testing on MiPOD comparable
to a MiPOD trained classifier testing on MiPOD.
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Figure 6.4 Boxplots of the projections g(x) = wTx of test image features x onto the normal
vector w of each FLD base-learner in an LSB trained Ensemble Classifier.
Test images are classified based on which side of the decision threshold their
projections fall.
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Figure 6.5 Boxplots of the projections g(x) = wTx of test image features x onto the normal
vector w of each FLD base-learner in an MiPOD trained Ensemble Classifier.
Test images are classified based on which side of the decision threshold their
projections fall.
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 BOSSbase Dataset
We perform algorithm mismatch experiments on image data from all seven BOSSbase devices for
three embedding rates: 10%, 20% and 40%. The results are shown in Figures 6.6-6.8. Each figure
shows the detection error rates of five classifiers. The name of the classifier refers to the embedding
algorithm upon which it was trained. The LSB Adjusted classifier is trained on cover and LSB
matching data and the decision threshold is adjusted within the Ensemble Classifier during training
as described in subsection Adjusting the Decision Threshold to Improve Classification Results of
the Methods section. The other four classifiers, LSB, MiPOD, S-UNIWARD, and WOW, use the
standard decision threshold. The grey titles denote the embedding algorithm being tested. The
error is the detection error as calculated in equation 6.1 when testing covers and a single embedding
algorithm.
Figures 6.6-6.8 show that adjusting the decision threshold when training on LSB matching
data drastically improves the detection error when testing MiPOD, S-UNIWARD, and WOW, and
produces error rates comparable to the best-case classifiers, typically within 3% or 4%. The MiPOD,
S-UNIWARD and WOW classifiers achieve decent detection error rates on all four algorithms.
Not unexpectedly, the overall error rates increase as the embedding rate decreases, but for each
embedding rate the LSB Adjusted classifiers are fairly close to the best-case classifiers.
6.5.1.1 Pentex K20D Experiments
Previous work has shown that training and testing on a single device Lin et al. (2018b) can
reduce detection error. We conduct algorithm mismatch experiments on a single BOSSbase device,
the Pentex K20D, and show that algorithm mismatch classifiers see improved results comparable
to the improvements for the best-case classifiers.
We use image data from the Pentex K20D digital still camera and run algorithm mismatch
experiments using sample sizes of 700 and 1,300 and embedding rate 10%. The sample size 700
results are shown in Figure 6.9. The results on the larger sample size are similar, so we omit them
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Figure 6.6 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 40% embedding on images
from all BOSSbase devices (training size=5,000)
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Figure 6.7 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 20% embedding on images
from all BOSSbase devices (training size=5,000)
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Figure 6.8 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on images
from all BOSSbase devices (training size=5,000)
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here. As expected, we see that restricting the dataset to a single device shows slight reduction in
error rates in the best-case classifiers compared to experiments on the entire dataset displayed in
Figure 6.8. The algorithm mismatch classifiers see similar reductions in error rates on the single
device. The MiPOD and S-UNIWARD trained classifiers have testing errors within 1% of each other
for all four testing algorithms. The LSB Adjusted classifier achieves testing errors within 2% of
the MiPOD and S-UNIWARD trained classifiers for all four testing algorithms. The WOW trained
classifier obtained testing errors within 3% of the MiPOD and S-UNIWARD trained classifiers.
6.5.2 iPhones Dataset
We perform algorithm mismatch experiments on the iPhone dataset. The results are shown in
Figure 6.10. As we saw with the BOSSbase dataset, the LSB Adjusted classifier achieves decent
detection error rates on MiPOD, S-UNIWARD and WOW, and MiPOD and S-UNIWARD do
remarkably well at detecting each other.
6.5.2.1 Individual Device Experiments
We perform algorithm mismatch experiments on individual iPhone devices. This reduces the
detection error rates of the best-case classifiers for four of the devices, while two devices see an
increase in error rates. However, on all devices the algorithm mismatch classifiers achieve decent
error rates in comparison to the best-case classifiers.
Figure 6.11 shows the detection error rates for the iPhone 6s (1) device with 10% embedding
rate. The results for the iPhone 6s (2) and iPhone 6s Plus (1) devices are similar, within 1%
of those shown in Figure 6.11 in most cases, so we omit them here. Figures 6.12-6.14 show the
detection error rates for the iPhone 6s Plus (2), iPhone 7 (1) and iPhone 7 (2) devices respectively.
Restriction to a specific device decreases the average testing errors in general for the iPhone 6s
and 6s Plus devices, while the average testing errors generally increase for the iPhone 7 devices.
The LSB Adjusted classifier obtains average testing errors within 4% of the best-case classifiers for
MiPOD and S-UNIWARD on all six devices. The LSB Adjusted classifier obtains average testing
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Figure 6.9 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on images
from BOSSbase Pentex K20D device (cross-validation with sample size=700)
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Figure 6.10 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on au-
to-exposure images from six iPhone devices (training size=5,000)
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errors for WOW within 5% of the best-case classifier on the iPhone 6s and 6s Plus devices, within
7% for the iPhone 7 (1), but only within 12% for the iPhone 7 (2).
6.5.2.2 Cross-Phone Experiments
We consider the scenario where the steganalyst does not have the same device but has a device
of the same model as well as devices from different models of the same make. We explored this
scenario in previous work and showed that in some cases detection error on cross-device tests can be
reduced by fixing the iso and exposure settings of the training and testing data Lin et al. (2018b).
Here we perform algorithm mismatch experiments across devices.
We train on auto-exposure image data from one iPhone device and test on each of the other
iPhone devices. The results when training on the iPhone 6s (2) are displayed in Figure 6.15. We
see that irrespective of the testing devices the MiPOD and S-UNIWARD trained classifiers obtain
similar testing errors to each other on all four embedding algorithms. We also see that generally the
LSB Adjusted classifiers achieve decent detection errors in comparison to the best-case classifiers.
The error rates for training on the iPhone 6s (1) and both iPhone 6s Plus devices and testing on
the other devices are similar to those shown in Figure 6.15 so we omit them here. The detection
error rates when training on the iPhone 7 devices and testing on the other devices are almost all
above 40%. This means that we can’t necessarily expect to get adequate results when testing on
an unseen device. If the best-case classifiers perform badly, so do the LSB Adjusted classifiers.
However, if the best-case classifiers do well, the LSB Adjusted classifiers achieve decent results as
well.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Work
New stego algorithms will inevitably continue to be created, increasing the likelihood that
steganalysis classifiers will encounter unseen algorithms. We present a straight-forward and non-
data-intensive steganalysis framework to address algorithm mismatch, the case where a classifier is
trained on one algorithm and tested on another.
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Figure 6.11 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on au-
to-exposure images from iPhone 6s (1) device (cross-validation with sample
size=700)
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Figure 6.12 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on auto–
exposure images from iPhone 6s Plus (2) device (cross-validation with sample
size=700)
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Figure 6.13 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on au-
to-exposure images from iPhone 7 (1) device (cross-validation with sample
size=700)
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Figure 6.14 Average error rate by classifier and test algorithm at 10% embedding on au-
to-exposure images from iPhone 7 (2) device (cross-validation with sample
size=700)
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Figure 6.15 Classifiers trained on auto-exposure images from iPhone 6s-2 device and tested
on auto-exposure images from iPhone 6s-1, iPhone 6s Plus-1 and iPhone 7-1
devices. Average error rate by classifier, test algorithm and test device at 10%
embedding (cross-validation with sample size=700)
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We train Ensemble Classifiers with Spatial Rich Model features on one of four embedding
algorithms - LSB matching, MiPOD, S-UNIWARD, or WOW - and test the classifier on all four
algorithms. We adjust the decision threshold of the Ensemble Classifier when training on LSB
matching data and use the standard decision threshold when training on the other three algorithms.
We use two datasets for training and testing: BOSSbase with 10%, 20% and 40% embedding rates,
and iPhone data with 10% embedding rate. The average detection errors for the best-case classifiers,
classifiers trained and tested on the same algorithm, for BOSSbase data were much larger than for
the iPhone data. However, the LSB trained classifier with adjusted threshold, and the MiPOD and
S-UNIWARD trained classifiers, achieved decent detection errors in comparison to the best-case
classifiers on both datasets.
We plan to conduct algorithm mismatch experiments with more stego embedding algorithms,
including at least one iPhone stego app. We also plan to further investigate and improve the
selection of the tuning parameter λ used to adjust the decision threshold when training on LSB
matching data.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, the effective range of the standard academic forensic tools for digital image
forensics, has been extended to the real-world image data, especially for the stego images generated
by steganography apps. Many cross-domain situations in practical image forensics are covered. In
Chapter 3, we show the possibility of using ML-based algorithms to detect stego images generated
by apps, provided that the cover source is included. According to Chapter 3, for images with
very flexible embedding rates, the best strategy is to build an image database with stego images
having lower embedding rate. Chapter 4 shows that, even for a included camera source, if we
ignored the impact of metadata, such as ISO speed and exposure time, it would bring much more
extra error in the detection of steganography. And the same phenomenon also happens in the
case of PRNU-based Camera Identification problems, in which the noise levels behind the exposure
settings play an important role. In Chapter 5, we build a more adaptive classifier by matching
the exposure settings, for the source devices that are out of the database, but the camera model is
included. The results in Chapter 5 shows that, to build a benchmarking image database, collecting
image data randomly from one camera model is not sufficient to detect stego images from another
device, even if they belong to the same camera model. Therefore, a successful image database for
benchmarking purposes, should cover a wide range of noise levels. Chapter 6 discusses the case of
blind steganalysis for three advanced steganography algorithms, and we show that, all these three
content-adaptive algorithms can be detected by adjusting the simplest classifier for LSB embedding.
Based on all above results, we design and build the first benchmarking database of stego images
created by apps: StegoAppDB in Newman et al. (2019).
There are many future tasks to continue for domain adaptation problems in digital image
forensics. Since early 2015, the convolutional neural networks (CNN) has been applied to detect
steganography by Qian et al. (2015). But all existing CNN-based steganalysis methods build an
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ensemble by merging the outputs of independently trained networks with the same architecture.
One of the future work is to design a universal CNN architecture such that the classifier is more
adaptive to different noise levels. Another potential future work is to find a better statistical model
for the PRNU-based camera identification problems, by introducing the impact factors of metadata.
Besides, considering the rapid growth of downloads of stego apps, an Automated machine learning
program is in urgent need, which is still almost blank.
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